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ABSTRACT 
After September 11, 2001, Central Asia leapt into the vernacular of international 
politics.  This forgotten region, where the “Great Game” was played, received new 
emphasis in the Global War on Terrorism.  Analysts found a region brimming with both 
promise and concern.  This thesis focuses on the future succession of two regional 
presidents, Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) and Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan), who 
are the only post-Soviet leaders their countries have known.  These are also the only two 
Central Asian states not to experience a leadership transition since independence.  These 
impending successions are potentially watershed events for Central Asia.  Succession 
outcomes in these states will not only have ramifications throughout the region given its 
interconnectedness, but also have foreign policy and economic implications for the global 
powers.  This thesis studies the neopatrimonial nature of the regimes, the clan politics 
permeating the societies, and trajectories literature to examine the succession issue in 
these states.  Conclusions reveal the conservative status quo tendencies presently 
embedded in these areas.  This indicates that regime stability in the same vein as 
Turkmenistan at Saparmurat Niyazov’s death is a more likely outcome for the states in 
question than are events such as the Tajik Civil War or Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution. 
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Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and repression, 
rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening socio-economic 
inequalities, and other problems that nurture nascent radical sentiment 
and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible case, central authority 
in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or regions 
vie for power—opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and 
criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when it 
was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.1 
       
     John D. Negroponte 
     Director of National Intelligence 
A. PURPOSE 
On September 11, 2001, Central Asia once again leapt into the vernacular of 
international politics.  This forgotten region of “stans,” where the “Great Game” was 
played by the British and Russian empires in the nineteenth century and around which Sir 
Halford MacKinder built his Heartland Theory in the twentieth, received new emphasis 
as the United States began to prosecute its Global War on Terrorism.  What these newly 
focused analysts found was a region brimming with both promise and concern.  On the 
positive side of the ledger the region possessed immense natural resources.  According to 
the CIA’s The World Factbook 2006, Kazakhstan ranks thirteenth in the world in proven 
oil reserves, while it, along with Uzbekistan, ranks in the top twenty-five globally in 
proven natural gas reserves.  Additionally, Uzbekistan is historically among the top five 
cotton producing nations in the world.2  Unfortunately, the possibility for a better 
economic future that these resources promise is accompanied by major causes for 
apprehension for at least three reasons.  First, the region’s leadership shares U.S. 
concerns about radical Islamic movements in the region, especially, in the wake of the 
civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) between the Tajik President Rakhmon Nabiyev’s 
                                                 
1 John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” 
testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2006, 16. 
2 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2006, 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (accessed October 6, 2006). 
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government forces and an opposition coalition consisting of reformist, Islamist, and clan 
elements.  Furthermore, all the Central Asian nations, except Kazakhstan, consistently 
rank high in the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index.3  Finally, the authoritarian records 
of the national leaders offer a poor prognosis for democracy in the region.   
 
Figure 1.   Map of Central Asia and the Caucasus.4 
 
This thesis will focus on the future succession scenarios of two regional 
presidents, Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) and Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan), and 
what it may mean for overall regional stability.  These two aging presidents were in 
power at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union and are the only leaders their respective  
 
                                                 
3 Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2006, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php (accessed October 6, 2006). 
4 Map downloaded from University of Texas at Austin Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/caucasus_cntrl_asia_pol_00.jpg (accessed May 25, 2007). 
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countries have known in the post-Soviet period.  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also the 
only two Central Asian states not to experience a leadership transition since 
independence.  
 
             
Figure 2.   President Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) and President Islam 
Karimov (Uzbekistan).5 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The impending succession scenarios in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the 
potential to be the watershed events for Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
The manner in which succession occurs in these two states will not only have 
ramifications throughout the entire region but will have foreign policy and economic 
implications for global powers like the United States, Russia, and China.  Both the United 
States and Russia have bases in Central Asia.  And, while all three nations have 
substantial economic investments in the area, China is especially interested in regional 
stability, as Beijing seeks to both contain Muslim separatist aspirations in its adjoining 
Xinjiang region and to build substantial ties to Central Asia to gain access to the region’s 
                                                 
5 Pictures downloaded from: The Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
http://www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_doc=09D042CF5E283B454625
72340019E679&lang=en&L1=L6# (accessed May 25, 2007); Republic of Uzbekistan, Portal of the State 
Authority, http://www.gov.uz/en/section.scm?sectionId=1746 (accessed May 25, 2007). 
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petroleum resources.  Major questions come to mind when looking at the transition 
problem:  Will these leadership changes be peaceful or violent?  Will they be managed 
handovers to pre-selected elites, ‘hostile takeovers’ within the elite structure, or 
revolutions of a democratic or Islamic character?  What is the potential for state failure?  
What are the implications for the region?  In the next section, the literature on succession 
in Central Asia will be examined to reveal a range of pessimistic opinions ranging from 
beliefs that Central Asia is not ready for democracy to the argument that the region is a 
potential powder keg of conflict. 
C. REVIEW OF VIEWS ON SUCCESSION 
As is to be expected, the literature offers no definitive answers to the questions of 
who the next generation of leaders will be in Central Asia or how long the current 
presidents will choose to or be able to stay in office.  However, writers grappling with 
this issue anchor their arguments in certain major themes.  Focusing on some of these 
themes, this section details potential scenarios for succession: 1) the current regimes will 
perpetuate themselves and remain at the helm in some fashion; 2) the regimes will be 
overthrown in a secular revolution either before, during, or after a succession handover; 
or 3) an Islamic revolution will sweep the region either before, during, or after a 
succession handover.6 
It is possible that the Presidents in question, Karimov and Nazarbayev, may 
successfully perpetuate their regimes in one form or another, as they appear to want their 
regime structures to survive past their time in office.  Both rulers have already delayed 
the succession question through the use of referendums, changes in legislation, favorable 
court interpretations of term-limit rules in their constitutions, and controlled elections.  
They also eliminated opponents and some potential successors in ways that cast a shadow 
                                                 
6 Sally N. Cummings, “Introduction: Power and Change in Central Asia,” In Power and Change in 
Central Asia, ed. Sally N. Cummings (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 19; Mark N. Katz, 
“Revolutionary Change in Central Asia,” World Affairs 168, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 157; John H. Herz, “The 
Problem of Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes: A Study in Comparative Law and Institutions,” The 
Journal of Politics 14, no. 1 (February 1952): 30; Mark N. Katz, “Policy Watch: Revolution in Central 
Asia,” United Press International, 14 January 2006, 
http://www.upi.com/archive/view.php?archive=1&StoryID=20060113-112525-8230r (accessed October 3, 
2006). 
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over the predictability of the succession process.  Nevertheless, while this has produced 
short term stability, sooner or later, succession will occur and the actions these men take 
will go a long way in determining the continuity with the regime that follows them and 
the long-term stability of their states.7 
The literature of regime perpetuation suggests three broad paths that leaders have 
a tendency to pursue relative to their succession.  First, the presidents may choose to 
select and groom a successor during their lifetime with the intention of either stepping 
down and handing over power or having power transfer at their death.  In this vein, there 
are those who conjecture that Karimov and Nazarbayev may attempt to hand over power 
to one of their family members, specifically to one of their children, when they are ready 
for a transition.  This was what Eric McGlinchey had in mind when he stated that 
“Central Asian rule today is moving more toward dynasty than toward democracy.”8  
Precedent for this exists in the post-Soviet period.  Heydar Aliyev essentially handed over 
the presidency to his son, Ilham Aliyev, in Azerbaijan in October 2003.  While there were 
complaints from opposition members, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
even by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the new Azeri 
president was not ostracized in the international community and business deals continued 
unimpeded.  Thus, the overall reception was not one that would deter others from 
attempting to emulate it.  Additionally, Rafis Abazov views familial succession in power 
positions as a traditional machination for political elites in Central Asia and believes an 
attempt to keep political power within their respective extended family structure is 





                                                 
7 Eric M. McGlinchey, “In For Life: Leadership Succession in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” PONARS 
Policy Memo 312 (November 2003): 3, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0312.pdf (accessed 
October 5, 2006); Mark N. Katz, “Policy Watch: C. Asian Strongmen Weak?,” United Press International, 
6 November 2005, http://www.upi.com/archive/view.php?archive+1&StoryID=20051104-081702-7495r 
(accessed October 3, 2006); Eugene B. Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not If,” 
Strategic Forum, no. 203 (December 2003): 1.  
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Tsarist Russia.  Abazov sees this as a further outgrowth of the fact that succession in 
Central Asia is far more likely to concentrate on personalities than on technical 
procedures.9 
Yet, there are major questions about the relative acceptability to powerful political 
elites and the general public in these states of selecting one’s progeny.  With that in mind, 
if their immediate offspring are ruled out, there are indications that one of their children’s 
spouses might rank high on the list of candidates or that the hand-picked successor will 
most likely rise from the pool of associates that surrounds each of these presidents.  
Russian President Boris Yeltsin did this with his selection of Vladimir Putin to succeed 
him in 1999.10 
If Nazarbayev or Karimov choose to anoint a successor, the political patterns in 
the region virtually guarantee that this process will be largely opaque to outsiders.  Media 
control in both states is extreme.  Only a small group of elites from key government 
positions, businesses, and clans would be expected to play a role in the discussion.  
Concern for the personal security and economic well-being of both the current office-
holders and their families will be a key point of negotiation.  For example, protection 
from future prosecution and from attacks on family financial portfolios was apparently an 
important criterion in Yeltsin’s aforementioned selection of Putin as his successor.  
Gregory Gleason directly alluded to this when he stated that “from the point of view of 
the political leadership, even more important than controlling the outcome of the election  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 McGlinchey, “In For Life,” 1. 
9 Rafis Abazov, “Kyrgyzstan: The Political Succession Game,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 24 
September 2003, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1760 (accessed October 5, 2006); 
Eugene Rumer, “Chaos, Not Democracy May Be Real Alternative to Dictators in Central Asia,” In The 
National Interest, 18 July 2005, 
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/articles/july%202005/July2005RumerPFV.html (accessed October 
20, 2006). 
10 Ustina Markus, “Central Asia’s Presidential Succession Prospects,” ISN Security Watch, 29 March 
2005, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=11008 (accessed October 5, 2006); Abazov, 
“Kyrgyzstan” ; Rumer, “Chaos, Not Democracy May Be Real Alternative to Dictators in Central Asia.” 
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is controlling how the future leaders deal with the legacy of the past.” 11  His reference is 
not from a standpoint of an historical legacy, but from the much more practical fiscal and 
security angle cited above. 
Does the grooming of a successor really matter?  The literature indicates that it 
does.  In the face of constitutional succession procedures that have not been tested, do not 
work, or are not intended to really be used, the selection of a successor in an authoritarian 
regime can help avoid a chaotic struggle when the current executive leaves office.  Those 
holding this view argue that the current regime’s origins, ideology, goals, and 
characteristics ultimately do little to influence the chances for successful regime 
perpetuation.  What matters is a “clear and unambiguous designation of a successor,” as 
this “seems to have been the decisive factor in successful transfers of power.” 12  This 
indicates that it would be rational to expect an autocrat to clearly name a replacement if 
he or she desires to have a ‘legacy regime.’  However, the calculation is not that 
uncomplicated or straightforward. 
The flip side of this coin spotlights the preeminent goal of authoritarian leaders 
such as Nazarbayev and Karimov, which is the protection of their current status and their 
continuation in power for as long as they desire it.  This is important because the 
literature also notes that the selection of a clear and unambiguous successor may serve to 
weaken an incumbent’s hold on the reins of power.  Thus, there is a school of thought 
that says these authoritarians may avoid the selection of a successor during their lifetime.  
At its most basic, the appointment of a successor may create a ‘crown prince problem’ 
since anyone strong enough and ambitious enough to be selected for this role may 
become the focus of an independent power structure long before the incumbent is ready 
to leave the presidency.13  Hence, fear may motivate the current presidents to simply not 
make a decision. 
                                                 
11 Gregory Gleason, “Red, Orange, Green, or Gray?  Shades of Political Succession in Central Asia,” 
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 12 January 2005, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2952 (accessed October 5, 2006); Abazov, 
“Kyrgyzstan”; Markus, “Central Asia’s Presidential Succession Prospects”; Rumer, “Central Asian 
Leadership Succession,” 2. 
12 Herz, “The Problem of Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes,” 32, 36-7; Cummings, “Introduction: 
Power and Change in Central Asia,” 20. 
13 Herz, “The Problem of Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes,” 30. 
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Another factor that the literature identifies is a general hubris or feeling of 
‘uniqueness,’ which may make them jealous of sharing the spotlight.  A more practical 
issue to consider is that the appointee must be acceptable to all of the power centers that 
underpin the regime and, to a limited degree, the population in general.  Designating one 
person could fracture alliances and prematurely generate a succession crisis.  
Consequently, the sitting presidents may avoid all of this by not designating anyone to 
follow them.  If this is the case, we would expect to see potential successors eliminated 
and the creation of a ‘comfortable void’ in the system.  While this avoids dangers to the 
leader and challenges to presidential authority in his lifetime, if followed, this course of 
action can leave the state open to confusion and conflict at the leader’s demise.  This is 
the path believed most likely by analysts like Ustina Markus and Eugene Rumer.14  
According to Rumer, “given the hold on power of the current generation of leaders, the 
notion that any of them would initiate an orderly succession while they are still firmly in 
control or even in the event of a terminal illness appears highly doubtful.”15 
If the incumbent autocrat does not select his successor, some other mechanism or 
a combination of formal and informal actors within the state structure itself will have to 
carry out this role.  There are constitutional and electoral guidelines in place in both 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but, as we saw after the death of Saparmurat Niyzaov in 
Turkmenistan, these are unlikely to be followed.  Additionally, the previously discussed 
Azerbaijani example demonstrated that Heydar Aliyev “failed to see transition in 
institutional terms and treated it as little more than a dynastic enterprise, seeking to hand 
over the presidency to his son rather than forge a meaningful compromise with the 
opposition and attempt to institutionalize a more open and transparent process.”16   
The actual affect on succession of having a constitutional framework in place in 
an authoritarian state is indefinite.  The literature typically disregards any prospect that 
elections would be followed in a free and fair manner in these cases and actually 
                                                 
14 Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession,” 2; Markus, “Central Asia’s Presidential Succession 
Prospects”; Cummings, “Introduction: Power and Change in Central Asia,” 20; Herz, “The Problem of 
Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes,” 30, 39. 
15 Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession,” 2. 
16 Ibid. 
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indicated that constitutional procedures seem to be benign or even supportive in the 
transfer of authority in an authoritarian regime.  Pseudo-democratic constitutional 
provisions were considered even more amenable to elite manipulation than mechanisms 
in state systems of a more monarchal character.  Even when these procedures were 
coupled with a forerunner’s clearly stated desire for a particular successor the essential 
element seemed to be the clear statement of intention rather than the constitutional 
provisions.  In effect, constitutional provisions are much more likely to be utilized by 
elites as a mere formality to legitimize closed-door decisions than as an instrument for 
lawful transition.17 
If the decision of a successor is left to the system, the elements of the coalition 
which ultimately decides on a replacement will be both small and, yet, diverse.  Informal 
institutional networks, i.e., clans, would be major participants in negotiations and their 
desires are likely to transcend those of formal bureaucratic actors in importance and be 
even less transparent to outside observers.  Other prominent seats at the table will likely 
be occupied by senior personnel from the police, military, security services, and interior 
ministry.  Support from these ‘power ministries’ represents a precondition for any future 
state leader.  By virtue of their control over the means of violence, these institutions will 
rise to even greater importance should succession turn into a crisis and force be required 
to perpetuate the regime’s hold on power.  Elite business representatives, who are also 
likely to be senior clan leaders or senior bureaucrats, are expected to participate in the 
debate.  Relying on others may have pitfalls for the autocrat hesitant or recalcitrant to 
announce a successor.  The possibility exists that elements within this structure may take 
it into their own hands early in order to protect their long-term vested interests.  
Additionally, the hesitancy of either Nazarbayev or Karimov to name a successor may 
inadvertently raise the prestige of elements within the elite structure who ultimately gain 
enough influence to undermine incumbent desires.  While elites may successfully  
 
 
                                                 
17 Herz, “The Problem of Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes,” 21, 30-2, 38; Gleason, “Red, Orange, 
Green, or Gray?” Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession,” 2-3. 
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transition the state to a new leader without conflict in their ranks, any perceived 
leadership vacuum, however long or brief, may prove too tempting to groups promoting a 
more revolutionary outcome.18 
Since independence, fear of secular revolutions has represented one of the 
primary justifications Central Asian leaders have utilized to avoid democratic reforms.  
Essentially, they maintain their citizens are not ready for democracy and in the absence of 
a strong hand the ‘rabble’ would destroy stability throughout the entire region.  This 
threat has typically been laced with Islamist connotations—a potentiality that will be 
dealt with in the next section.  The occurrence of ‘color revolutions’ in the post-Soviet 
countries of Georgia (Rose 2003), Ukraine (Orange 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip 2005) 
raised the specter for occurrences in other post-Soviet spaces.  Askar Akayev’s ouster 
next door in Kyrgyzstan was particularly unnerving.  As a consequence, Central Asian 
leaders took steps to keep themselves from being swept under during this ‘democratic 
wave,’ which also took the Lebanese Cedar Revolution in 2005 into account.  Most 
authors attribute Akayev’s fall to the lack of force, particularly deadly force, in his 
response to the protests.  While security forces were utilized, they were not allowed to 
fire on the crowd, which emboldened the protestors.  Other contributing factors identified 
were the presence of NGOs from the western states, as well as from Georgia and the 
Ukraine, the opportunity to conduct exit polling that could be used to challenge the 
official results, and the presence of domestic and international media outlets broadcasting 
the story.  However, despite expectations among some at the time, Akayev’s overthrow 
has produced no further episodes in the region to date.19 
Authors also recognize that the Uzbek and Kazakh regimes are tougher on their 
political opponents, more firmly entrenched, and more likely to use deadly force in 
                                                 
18 Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession,” 2-3; Herz, “The Problem of Successorship in 
Dictatorial Regimes,” 21, 30. 
19 Mark N. Katz, “Policy Watch: No More Color Revolutions?,” United Press International, 11 
December 2005, http://www.upi.com/archive/view.php?archive=1&StoryID=20051209-083447-1459r 
(accessed October 3, 2006); Katz, “Policy Watch: Revolution in Central Asia”; Gleason, “Red, Orange, 
Green, or Gray?”; Katz, “C. Asian Strongmen Weak?”; Martha Brill Olcott, “The Next Act in Central 
Asia’s Transition Drama,” The Moscow Times, 12 April 2005, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16772&prog=zru (accessed 
October 4, 2006). 
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similar situations.  As evidenced by the events at Andijon in May 2005, Karimov has 
demonstrated his willingness to do so.  And, while Nazarbayev has not been confronted 
by a similar situation and generally attempts to appear less heavy handed in his responses 
by co-opting or arresting opponents, authors allege that the Kazakh regime played a role 
in the death of at least two major political opponents, Zamanbek Nurkadilov (2005) and 
Altynbek Sarsenbaev (2006), and, that given Akayev’s fate, it is unlikely Nazarbayev 
would restrain his security forces.  In and of itself, the readiness and capacity to use force 
is cited as insurance for the survivability of these regimes in the near term.  Moreover, 
other steps have been taken to ensure they are not added to the list of successful 
evictions.20 
Tighter controls were placed on NGOs, measures were taken to prevent accurate 
independent exit polls, foreign journalists have been severely limited and some media 
outlets expelled, indigenous journalists work in an increasingly antagonistic environment, 
and greater restrictions on public assembly during elections were put in place in an 
attempt to prevent crowds from getting too large to control.  Since the successful 
episodes occurred during elections and given that the electoral process will likely be 
utilized to legitimize any successor, these were obvious preventive steps to take.  
Additionally, in an attempt to combat negative reports about the lack of free and fair 
elections by western observers, the Uzbek and Kazakh regimes now bring in their own 
independent election observers, typically from Russia.  The reports issued by these 
observers have been much more favorable although their views have not been accepted as 
accurate in the west and internal actors have reacted negatively to this orchestration as 
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Kazakhstan (December 2005) greatly diminished expectations that the current regimes 
would be overthrown or their hand-picked successors prevented from taking office by a 
mass mobilization.21 
However, while the expectation of a secular revolution may have lost momentum, 
the underlying social, economic, and political conditions, which were cited as 
contributing factors in the previous color revolutions, remain present in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.  The literature cites the possibility that these conditions could generate an 
Islamic revolution in the region.  Mark Katz makes the point that “suppression of 
peaceful democratic revolutionary movements may not lead to stability of the 
authoritarian regimes, but instead to the rise of revolutionary movements that are neither 
peaceful nor democratic.”22  This has been the main danger referenced by Central Asian 
leaders, particularly Karimov, for the last decade and a half.  There are mixed reviews 
concerning the prospects for Islamic revolution, especially given the historic hold of the 
more tolerant Hanafi School of jurisprudence there.  Nevertheless, there are Islamic 
organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir 
actively advocating revolutionary and pan-nationalist goals.  Additionally, given the tight 
controls on political expression in the region, Graham Fuller has observed that “political 
Islam still remains the only realistic major alternative to most of today’s authoritarian 
regimes.”23 
Although it is unclear what electoral strength Islamic parties would have at the 
polls, the current regimes demonstrate no tolerance for their participation in the political 
process.  Hence, they function underground in a fashion reminiscent of the Soviet period.  
It is worthy of note, however, that Islamic organizations appear to have played virtually 
no role in the Kyrgyz revolution.  This begs a question.  Why did they not seize the 
opportunity to act during the obvious turmoil there?  The IMU has attempted to foment 
insurgency, but has thus far been unsuccessful either in its attempt to overthrow the 
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23 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 15; Ahmed 
Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 26. 
 13
government in Uzbekistan or in just sustaining the existence of an active insurgency 
itself.  Thus far the region has not been fertile ground for this style of regime change.24 
A subdivision of the discussion of revolution broaches the possibility of a coup 
d'état.  This scenario has both secular and religious angles.  A coup could originate within 
the formal government structure itself, the informal elite power structure, moderate 
opposition figures within the elite, or through the infiltration of Islamists into the state 
security apparatus.  The transition period during succession may provide the most fertile 
soil for this activity to be successful.  While this is considered unlikely in Kazakhstan, it 
is viewed by Katz as possibly the most likely means of bringing down the Karimov 
government.  The primary virtue of a coup lies in the fact that unlike the previously 
discussed revolutions and insurgencies, which take time and thus potentially provide 
some forewarning, a coup can strike without warning and be over so quickly that the 
regime may not be able to mount a defense.25 
Ultimately, what the literature details is that revolutions to unseat the current 
presidents or their designated successors may be secular or religious in nature and that the 
road to both is potentially paved with similar social, political, and economic building 
blocks.  Attempts to hang on to power until death or to hand-pick a successor may 
provide the spark to ignite a violent reaction from regime critics if the lives of citizens do 
not improve.  As Markus points out, the post-Soviet populace was generally well 
educated and was told with the fall of communism that they were going to have better 
lives and more input into the political system.  The retreat in both of these categories, as 
well as perceptions that the regimes are only serving their own fiscal interests, could 
prove to be a volatile mixture.26  As Charles Fairbanks details the “leadership 
successions…open up the easiest path to sudden change.”27  Fairbanks maintains that the 
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decisive moment will be “the ‘free’ elections without which no successor president can 
claim legitimacy” and says that the ultimate question will be, how much fraud will 
simply be too much for the people to handle? 28  This could prove to be a major question. 
Should a succession crisis arise and the regime strikes quickly, the literature is in 
basic agreement that the transition from incumbent to successor will be successful.  
However, in the event that it is protracted, the outcome becomes more obscure.  A 
prolonged crisis is viewed by authors as a window of opportunity to derail the transition 
process.  The likelihood exists that some faction in the elite structure that is vying for 
power will reach out to other blocs—secular or Islamist—that have been excluded from 
the political process to form an alliance in order to expand their power base.  They may 
do this believing that they can control or discard these alliance partners after the crisis is 
over.  If the balance of power tips away from the incumbent regime elements, the rest of 
the elite structure may remove their support in order to be on the likely winning side.  
Alternatively, these ‘outsider elements’ may be able to use this period of uncertainty to 
overthrow both the incumbent regime and their new ‘partners’.  Robert Pastor states the 
key group to watch during such a situation is the middle class as he maintains that 
historically the side they choose to ally with typically wins.  They have even been known 
to side with non-democratic parties in order to bring down a hated regime that has 
resisted democratization when they see no other alternative.  Another group that will 
likely prove even more important in the Central Asian context is the conglomeration of 
various security organizations (police, military, security services, Interior Ministry, etc.).  
Their willingness or unwillingness to maintain support for the incumbent regime in a 
succession crisis will be a major determinant of who ultimately gains power.29 
It is debated, however, whether there will be a succession crisis for any sub-
groups to take advantage of.  Although discussing Mobutu Sese Seko in 1988, Jean-
Claude Willame could well have been speaking about the leaders in Central Asia when he 
said, “for many years ‘there has been a widespread sense of expectancy’ in Zaire, a 
                                                 
28 Fairbanks, “Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup,” 54.  
29 Robert A. Pastor, “Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U.S. Influence,” International 
Security 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991), 77-78; Katz, “Policy Watch: Revolution in Central Asia”; Katz, “C. Asian 
Strongmen Weak”; Katz, “Revolutionary Change in Central Asia,” 159; Olcott, “The Next Act in Central 
Asia’s Transition Drama.” 
 15
premonition of ‘fin de regime’.”30  Quoting Crawford Young, Willame expands this 
statement by stating that even though a “dissolution of the current fabric of power is an 
ever-present possibility…the surprising survival capacity of the regime makes risky any 
assertion of the inevitability of such a change.”31 
One factor cited by Rumer as putting “a brake on destabilizing tendencies in a 
succession crisis” is the lack of a strong, well-organized opposition structure in either of 
these countries.32   This makes mobilization of the populace extremely difficult, 
particularly when dealing with governments that energetically crack down on any 
opposition.  Rumer further argues that militant Islamist factions, specifically the IMU, 
were dealt a huge blow in Afghanistan and that no government in the region is likely to 
harbor them, as each regime views them as a common enemy.  Thus, leaving them with a 
huge rebuilding process and logistical problem that they may be able to overcome in the 
long term, but not likely in time to affect the outcome of a succession crisis.  Others 
argue that these regimes have proven to be quite durable and that while fraudulent 
elections did lead to overthrows in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan many comparable 
elections have taken place in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan without major disturbances.  It 
is Eric McGlinchey’s belief that “not since the Brezhnev period have Central Asian 
leaders been so thoroughly insulated from grassroots pressure.”33 
While it is debatable whether there will be a succession crisis or not, it is not 
debatable that succession will eventually occur in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  The 
ages of the two leaders in question bear this simple fact out; Karimov was born on 
January 30, 1938 and Nazarbayev on July 6, 1940.  It is also almost universally 
recognized that the absence of a stable, predictable succession system casts a major 
shadow over the future with many negative potential implications.  Gregory Gleason 
argues that “the longer the adoption of an orderly procedure for political succession is 
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postponed, the more likely the succession will involve open conflict.”34  As Rumer put it, 
“in the next ten years leadership succession will emerge as the most important political 
issue in Central Asia.”35 
As inevitable as leadership change is, Rumer does not believe that it is certain that 
new leaders will mean new policies or ways of doing business and further asserts that the 
issue of succession is unlikely to destabilize the region.  Conversely, Katz argues 
succession “may prove especially perilous for these regimes” and that, even if they are 
successful in negotiating the terrain this time, there is no guarantee that the successors 
will be able to avoid a crisis.36  Much of the danger is generated by the nature of the 
regimes themselves.  Each country has a presidential system which is so strong that the 
very system itself is identified with the individual leader, while the underpinning of that 
system is inhabited by a comparatively small number of elites working in a system that 
rewards loyalty.  Thus, the informal rules are much more important that the formal ones.  
And, as Gleason stresses, the “political succession in these countries is apt to be decided 
outside of a competitive democratic process.”37 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Individual authors in the body of literature examined lay out many of the potential 
paths that succession may take.  They correctly identify the nature of the regimes in 
question, as well as the importance of patronage networks that permeate the system.  
However, this is done in individual pieces with no real amalgamation of the data into a 
fused product.  Essentially, the literature is devoid of a composite picture that brings 
together all of the elements including the neopatrimonial nature of these regimes and 
their possible intentions for succession, the clan politics that surrounds them, and the 
possible trajectories that political science theory demonstrates is possible.  While precise 
predictions of exact succession outcomes for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are not 
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possible, by putting these pieces of the puzzle together, we can form an image of what 
current trends indicate.  The intention of this thesis is to do just that. 
The cases of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will be examined utilizing various 
building blocks to construct my analysis of the succession issue.  In Chapter II the first 
two pieces of the puzzle will be assembled.  That chapter will explore the backgrounds of 
the two presidents and potential succession plans they may have.  In addition, the effects 
of clan politics will be examined in each state to explore its potential effects on process 
outcomes.  Chapter III will investigate possible trajectories for these regimes.  
Specifically, I will utilize Richard Snyder’s theoretical work on the trajectories of 
neopatrimonial regimes to assess whether the literature implies that regime stability, 
revolution, military coup, or transition to democracy is most likely.  Finally, Chapter IV 
will present an overall assessment and conclusions.38 
It is not the intent of this thesis to utilize a crystal ball to predict the future; 
however, by examining incumbent intentions, the effects of clan politics, and the possible 
trajectories for these regimes presented in the literature, it is my belief that a cogent 
analysis can be performed to give us an idea of the situation these countries, and the 
region as a whole, may find themselves in when the time for succession arrives.  This, in 
turn, will provide any planners concerned with stability issues in Central Asia a starting 
point to begin their preparations from.  
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II. NATURE OF THE REGIMES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the nature of the Karimov and Nazarbayev regimes.  What 
it ultimately reveals are two neopatrimonial regimes that have taken extensive measures 
to strengthen their positions since the late 1980s.  The patronage networks they have built 
control extensive resources.  This makes the determination of who sits in the presidential 
seat extremely important, since it influences who has access to state resources for 
redistribution in their networks.  The literature also shows that these regimes continue to 
take steps to perpetuate their current control and appear to have a desire for a controlled 
handoff of power when the time arises.  However, any succession plans must take into 
account the underlying clan politics, which have played and continue to play a key role in 
the political life of both states.  As Tajikistan revealed with its civil war in the 1990s, 
leaders ignore this element at their own peril. 
B. NEOPATRIMONIALISM 
In a neopatrimonial regime the head of state derives his authority and legitimacy 
from patronage networks rather than an ideology or the rule of law.  These regimes blend 
aspects from both patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination.  
Neopatrimonialism is characterized by the intertwining of the informal with the formal.  
The president wields tremendous formal power in relation to other government branches, 
while he or she also wields a great degree of informal power based on patron-client 
relations.  Informal relationships cross over into, and dominate virtually all aspects of, the 
formal state structure and, in essence, this mixture becomes the institutionalized norm.  
The right to rule is embodied in a person instead of an office and the exercise of authority 
takes the form of transfers of public resources rather than formalized bureaucratic or legal 
practices.  Government offices are conduits to personal or network enrichment rather than 
an opportunity for state betterment.  As such, personal loyalty and dependence 
relationships define the entire structure.  One’s position in the state is defined by the 
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relationship with the leader.  This creates a situation where government institutions have 
great difficulty in fulfilling, or do not even try to fulfill, their roles in delivering public 
goods and services to the populace.  Policies are typically formulated for the good of the 
few rather than the welfare of the many.  As a result, government institutions typically 
suffer from a lack of legitimacy.  The unpredictability of elite actions can generate a 
sense of insecurity in those outside the halls of power due to the need to negotiate both 
the formal and informal structures in the state.39 
In contrast to a bureaucratic-rational regime where positional appointments are 
based on personal merit—education level, training, entrance examination score—and the 
positions or offices have clearly defined responsibilities, as well as advancement criteria, 
the neopatrimonial structure is populated by officials who received their positions based 
on loyalty to a leader or group, clan or tribal membership, or some other measure not 
directly related to the functions of the position.  These posts typically lack well-defined 
criteria for career advancement and have poorly defined responsibilities.  That is not to 
say that all actions taken in this regard are made based on informal procedures.  A certain 
percentage of positional appointments, business and professional licenses issued, and 
promotions granted may be made based on laws or administrative procedures; however, 
at a system level, corruption and nepotism hold sway.40 
Neopatrimonialism is distinguishable from traditional patrimonialism.  Richard 
Pipes defined patrimonialism as a “regime where the rights of sovereignty and those of 
ownership blend to the point of becoming indistinguishable, and political power is 
exercised in the same manner as economic power…the political structure becomes 
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essentially identical with that of a gigantic landed estate.”41  A proprietary mindset is 
developed by those wielding power and, for all intents and purposes, “the economic 
element…absorbs the political.”42  Guenther Roth described patrimonialism as “almost 
like traveling to the past” due to its reliance on hereditary succession and traditional 
forms of legitimization.43  In patrimonial regimes all governmental transactions are 
considered personal transactions, as the line between public and private does not exist 
and there is what Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel call a “direct dyadic exchange…between 
the little and big man.”44  Conversely, neopatrimonial regimes recognize that there are 
both public and private spheres, although they typically do not observe the differentiation 
in practice, and, as a result, transactions take place within the skeleton of a modern state 
organism.  These resource transfers concern goods that are recognized as public rather 
than private and are carried out by agents at each social level who act as a go-between in 
the exchanges linking the “big man” and the “little man.”45 
Neither should neopatrimonial relationships be characterized as purely 
clientelistic in nature.  Clientelism is more of a ‘business’ interaction involving two 
individuals not linked by another means and tied together only by the dealings in question 
and only for so long as the relationship continues to favor both parties or for as long as 
specific transactions last.  Patronage networks in neopatrimonial terms, however, 
typically involve an affiliation between an individual and a larger group with social, 
familial, clan, tribal or other types of bonds that potentially fasten the parties together in a 
relationship related to more than just the next exchange of goods or support.46 
Neopatrimonialism should also not be confused with ‘sultanism.’  As defined by 
H.E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, a sultanistic ruler “exercises his power without restraint, at 
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his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an 
ideology or value system.”47  Loyalty emanates from fear and rewards, not ties of 
kinship, ideology, or abilities of the leader.  The bureaucratic culture is regularly 
subverted by unpredictable and arbitrary decisions that do not have to be justified, as the 
ruler is not beholden to any class or group interests.48  Pipes summed this as “the 
complete ownership of the land and mastery over the population.”49  The two regime 
types do share similar methods for appointing government officials—again, based on 
relationships and deals, not personal qualifications and skill-sets—as well as tremendous 
power in the chief executive; however, there is a differentiation in degree.  Chehabi and 
Linz describe this demarcation when they describe that “a regime in which some 
sultanistic tendencies are present, but where the circle of clients is wider and the 
discretion of the ruler less extensive, should be called neopatrimonial.”50 
Presidents in a neopatrimonial state exercise power by allowing elites to use their 
official positions to advance their private interests or those of their group in exchange for 
loyalty and support.  This builds a system based on mutual dependence.  The executive 
depends on elites to carry out policies and to deliver supporters at the polls.  Elites, in 
turn, rely on the leader to give them access to resources or positions of authority in the 
bureaucracy.  This situation functions in large part because opportunities for wealth 
generation in these states rest in the access to state resources and institutions.  
Bureaucratic appointments bestow access to the informal income sources that are much 
more important and remunerative.  In effect, it is much easier to become wealthy via the 
state than through legitimate business interests.  Businessmen with no political 
connections have few opportunities and little chance for success in this environment.  In 
this condition of public-private overlap, the public sector is usurped and arrogated by 
private interests.  Of importance, the leader does not need to control the entire economy 
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to make this work.  Only key sectors, such as oil, natural gas, gold, or cotton, need be 
controlled to effectively perpetuate the patronage system that brings together the coalition 
of vested elites necessary to underpin a government.51 
If any individual or faction stops supporting the executive or loses his approval, 
positions will likely be forfeited, depriving them of access to state resources and sources 
of income.52  It was not surprising to McGlinchey that the presidents being discussed 
here repressed elites.  What was surprising to him is that “those who are most harshly 
treated are wayward members of the internal elite, not activists from the political 
opposition,” which effectively delivers the message that “internal challenges will not be 
tolerated.”53  The potential to lose their power and authority makes participants reluctant 
to challenge the chief executive.  Leaders are aided by the general level of greed and 
rivalry that exists within the overall elite structure.  The ability to use selective 
repression, along with the ability to bequeath huge rewards, gives executives a great deal 
of maneuver room due to the requirement for elites to act collectively if they are to 
successfully oppose him.  Given the president’s access to resources, elites contemplating 
a challenge can never be certain of the loyalty of their peers due to the possibility that the 
leader may be able to secretly co-opt individuals or factions.54  Thus, these leaders are “in 
an excellent position to divide and rule elites and thereby to dry up political opportunities 
and resources available to opponents.”55 
Of critical significance, however, is Hale’s observation that this calculation 
changes when regimes enter a ‘lame-duck’ phase.  Hale maintains that understanding the 
lame-duck syndrome gives major insight into why Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan 
experienced color revolutions, while other post-Soviet states have not.  This phenomenon 
is generated when elites perceive a transfer of power is in the offing.  Whether the 
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departure is due to an illness, term limits, critical loss of public support, or an announced 
exit does not matter.  What is significant is the dynamic generated by this impending 
departure which potentially leaves the leader in an impotent position—unable to deliver 
rewards or punishment in an effective manner.  When the president has solid control, a 
high level of elite cohesion is the norm.  Once the future is in doubt and elites begin to 
feel that they can act with relative impunity, this accord begins to splinter and factions 
form around potential successors.  Elites will attempt to ensure they end up on the 
winning side.  Defection from the incumbent’s intended heir, if one has been named, may 
occur if elites do not believe this person will honor previous patronage arrangements or 
powerful factions form around a more popular choice.  Additionally, blocs may put 
forward a challenger in an attempt to change the relative balance-of-power within the 
patronage system at this critical juncture.  If no clear successor comes to the fore early in 
the process, infighting can be brutal with all parties mobilizing their resource bases, 
which can include bringing followers into the streets.  In Hale’s view, a popular 
incumbent is more likely to be able to have a successful hand-off to a hand-picked 
successor, while a less popular leader may fail in this regard.  The critical piece of this 
argument is that neither Kazakhstan nor Uzbekistan has entered this lame-duck phase as 
Nazarbayev and Karimov have successfully pushed their exits into the future and, as a 
consequence of this, elites have seen defection as an extremely risky proposition.56 
Neopatrimonial leaders grow to be considered ‘unique’ individuals, which 
interleaves special problems into the political system when the question of succession is 
raised.57  As Roger Kangas stated, it is “one of the pitfalls of relying on the personal 
authority of a president at the expense of a system of government.”58  John Ishiyama 
further argues that transitions in neopatrimonial systems are exceptionally challenging 
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due to the “legacy of the concentration of power in such ‘strong presidential’ systems.”59  
This raises serious questions.  How do you replace this “unique and unrepeatable 
personality?”60  Is the ‘mystique’ transferable to another person or an institution?  How 
will future leaders achieve legitimacy?  Answers to these questions are critical to the 
future of the regime and affect many decisions leaders make as they move later and later 
into their tenure.  The answers to these questions help determine if succession will cause 
a ‘crisis’ or is merely just another event in the political life of a state.  Even with 
constitutional frameworks in place that dictate elections or spell out the mode of 
succession should a leader die in office, there are no guarantees that these mechanisms 
will be allowed to run their course.61  Whatever the outcome of the succession phase, 
Richard Snyder states that successor regimes “are often not well institutionalized and 
consequently tend to be unstable.”62 
According to Herz, this problem has traditionally “been considered as insoluble 
through rational legal means.”63  The lack of an orderly departure was identified as a 
huge drawback of forms of government centered on an individual.  Historically, creating 
a hereditary monarchy was considered the way of solving this; however, monarchy is no 
longer considered a viable option for many reasons, not the least of which is that it is not 
compatible with the democratic veneer that these regimes have erected.  On the other 
hand, the role of the ‘lieutenants’ that run the regime machinery has been explored more 
recently and these individuals are considered potential answers to this quandary by virtue 
of their positions around the leader.  They form a “leadership pool for successorship.”64  
That these subordinates likely received their positions based on being representatives of 
vested interests, which likely played a role in the regime’s creation and perpetuation, 
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strengthens this line of thought.65  While “almost anything, at such a moment, is 
politically possible,” vested interests in neopatrimonial regimes are very likely to attempt 
to stabilize the situation and perpetuate their interests.66  These vested interests include 
the clans, which this chapter now turns to. 
C. CLAN POLITICS 
Clan politics is a major force under-girding current Central Asian regimes.  
Central Asia’s presidents do not maintain their status as a result of being the head of 
major political parties or by being in charge of the military.  They maintain their status by 
“being at the head of networks of elites who seek to retain firm control over the state both 
to remain in power and to advance their own private interests.”67  These networks 
represent the clan structure that permeates society in what Kathleen Collins likened to a 
“clan-based authoritarianism.”68  Using Collins’ definition, a clan is “an informal social 
institution in which actual or notional kinship based on blood or marriage forms the 
central bond among members.”69  This identity is considered stronger in Central Asia 
than national, linguistic, or religious bonds and provides a web of relationships that may 
encompass approximately 2,000 to 20,000 people.  Although typically associated with a 
particular location due to the ease of maintaining associations, the familial nature of the 
clan bond allows them to survive across spatial separation.70 
The leaders standing atop these structures derive their prominence from birth, 
marriage, personal connections, or individual accomplishments.  They serve numerous 
functions that broadly control how money and power are distributed to members.  Non-
elites depend on leaders to provide security, dispute resolution, access to jobs, access to 
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education, access to goods, personal loans, and to serve as guarantors for business 
transactions.  In effect, the clan appropriates the role of the central government and 
provides a form of social safety net.  Clan elites depend on the non-elites’ allegiance and 
respect in order to maintain their status in society, to protect clan interests, and to make 
new gains in power.  This network functions as an alternative to official bureaucracies 
when formal institutions are weak or not present.71  As Collins stated, they “reduce the 
high transaction costs of making deals…[where] stable expectations are hard to form.”72  
The interactions occurring both within a clan and between clans in the competition for 
state offices and resources are referred to as ‘clan politics.’73 
Soviet rule wrecked havoc on most larger tribal identities in Central Asia, but 
collectivized agricultural practices, for instance, only served to strengthen the clans, 
which went underground during the roughly seven decades of communist rule.  Clans 
used Soviet institutions to further their own agendas.  This was largely ignored under 
Leonid Brezhnev.  However, Yuri Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachev sought an end to 
the policy of letting Central Asians govern the republics largely how they wished as long 
as they did not challenge the communist party and attempted to purge clan patronage.  
This resulted in 30,000 arrests across the region and the installation of an ethnically 
Russian cohort of bureaucrats.  The extensive power losses created unity across clan 
networks and a focus on resistance among leaders, who saw Moscow as a common threat.  
As the Soviet state weakened, clans reasserted themselves through riots that discredited 
Gorbachev’s appointees.  Clan leaders and Gorbachev subsequently agreed on 
compromise candidates, Karimov and Nazarbayev, to serve as republic first secretaries.  
Neither was perceived by Moscow or the rival clans as too strong or well entrenched to 
be a threat.  This is in stark contrast to the ‘Big Man’ persona each portrays and to the 
idea that each would have their people and the world believe—that they rose to power on 
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their remarkable accomplishments and leadership qualities.  With stability restored and 
Central Asians back in control, the clans found themselves in a relative balance-of-power 
situation everywhere except Tajikistan, which played a major role in its future conflict.74 
Stability in post-Soviet Central Asia was facilitated by the informal pacts 
negotiated among clan elites in each state—part of which led to the aforementioned 
selection of Karimov and Nazarbayev.  According to Collins, pacts between clans build 
stability by establishing a balance-of-power relationship and by instituting informal rules 
to govern how state resources will be dealt with outside of the formal constructs.75  Clans 
construct these arrangements when three conditions are met: “1) A shared external threat 
induces cooperation among clans that otherwise have insular interests, 2) A balance of 
power exists among the major clan factions, such that none can dominate, and 3) A 
legitimate broker, a leader trusted by all factions, assumes a role of maintaining the pact 
and the distribution of resources that it sets in place.”76  Karimov and Nazarbayev play 
the role of legitimate broker in this equation.  Pacts are particularly important in order to 
avoid collapse and violence when there is a shock in the system.  With a pact, you had 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, while, without a pact, you had the Tajik civil 
war.77 
Many observers expected religious and ethnic turmoil in the region when the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist and, yet, this did not happen.  While containing Islamist 
participants, the war in Tajikistan was more of an inter-clan power struggle.  Collins also 
views the clans as a form of insulation against the attraction of Islamist movements.  
Hearkening back to the pre-Soviet days, religious leaders occupied a subordinate position 
to the clan elders on the communal governing committees.  Religious leaders had very 
specific religious duties that were supervised by this committee.  Collins maintains that 
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Islam is still subordinate to the clan and, to support this idea, states that 96 percent of 
villagers she surveyed replied that religious authorities from outside their region would 
be rejected.  In the post-Soviet period there was a resurgence of ‘popular Islam,’ but 
religious teachers attempting to bring ‘foreign versions’ of Islam have for the most part 
been rebuffed.  Thus, explaining the difficulty for Salafist groups, such as the IMU, to 
recruit in regime-threatening numbers in the area to this point.78 
Clans can have destabilizing effects of their own.  While there is a formal 
constitution delineating institutional responsibilities, pacts create a shadow system that 
has little to do with, and is most often superseding of, the formal institutions.  The 
informal becomes, in a sense, institutionalized.  Clan bargaining tables are where the 
major state decisions are made, not legislative bodies.  Referring back to the discussion of 
neopatrimonialism, these networks award jobs based on personal connections rather than 
skills.  They engage in asset stripping to deliver resources to their network.  In a good 
economy, this may just ‘feed the machine’ with the resultant effects that resentment 
builds among the have-nots and state weakness in the delivery of public goods in 
demonstrated.  In bad economic conditions, asset stripping quickens as clans attempt to 
ensure they get all they can of the ever shrinking pie, which further weakens state 
capabilities, creating the potential for state bankruptcy and failure.  If the regime 
perceives what is occurring, it will likely break the pact by attempting to exclude clans 
that it can longer afford to patronize.79  “A broken pact weakens regime durability” and 
greatly increases the potential for inter-clan violence.80 
Clan politics has a ‘crowding out’ effect in the political spectrum.  Formal 
institutions are sidelined by the ability of clan leaders to organize their followers.  This 
effectively removes forms of political participation from the public sphere.  Elites have 
no need to create formal political parties, when they can simply mobilize their networks 
and ‘get out the vote.’  Thus, they often avoid the uncertainties and expenses associated 
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with the creation of parties, formal platforms, and genuine campaigns.  While these 
organizations and actions might, in reality, generate a more wide-ranging support base for 
particular elites across the state, they would also entail the uncertainty, fickleness, and 
unreliability of western-style voting constituencies versus the ‘sure-thing’ their clan 
networks represent.  What suffers in this situation is any prospect for real competitive 
voting.81 
This essay now turns to an examination of these concepts as they relate to 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  Specifically, beginning with Uzbekistan, the backgrounds 
of the neopatrimonial regimes embodied in and led by Karimov and Nazarbayev will be 
explored.  Each arrived at his current station in life via a similar seminal set of events, but 
by traveling dramatically different roads to get there.  This will be combined with an 
inspection of the clan structures which both pervade the societies in each of these states 
and have a direct impact on the shape of the political system that administers them.  The 
description of these affinity groupings differs slightly in each state, but what will be 
shown is that they similarly affect aspects of life at all levels from basic everyday issues 
such as employment all the way to government policy, and more important for this work, 
the issue of succession.  Finally, specific potential successors will be investigated, 
starting with the current incumbents.  While no definitive successor or succession 
scenario appears to have been decided, there are a number of potential individuals in both 
countries that circulate in the literature. 
D. BACKGROUND, CLAN STRUCTURES, AND POTENTIAL 
SUCCESSION INTENTIONS 
1. Uzbekistan 
As Kangas put it, “if one were to gauge the possibility of ‘future leadership’, 
Islam Karimov would probably not be high on anyone’s list in the 1960s and 1970s—
during his formative years.”82  Donald Carlisle further states that “nothing in his early 
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life…or in mid-career suggested he was likely to emerge at the top of the political 
pyramid.”83  Karimov’s appointment by Mikhail Gorbachev to replace Rafiq Nishanov as 
the First Secretary of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in June 1989 and 
subsequent election to the Presidency in March 1990 were quite unanticipated by outside 
observers.  Karimov essentially emerged from the political exile of being First Secretary 
of the Kashkadarya Oblast, which Nishanov had consigned him to in 1988.  Even before 
that he was an economic technocrat, not a politician.  After serving for several years as a 
Gosplan (State Committee for Planning) bureaucrat, Karimov became the Uzbek SSR’s 
Minister for Finance from 1983 to 1986 under Inamzhan Usmankhodzhaev.  Before this 
position he had held no party post at any level.84 
The story of Karimov’s rise really begins with his exile by Nishanov, who was 
largely acting out the traditional action of cleaning out a predecessor’s supporters and 
replacing them with one’s own.  As was previously noted, his ascension occurred during 
Moscow’s attempts to root out patronage networks in the region.  This resulted in a series 
of demonstrations in Uzbekistan culminating in the June 1989 Ferghana Valley riots that 
were Nishanov’s demise.85  This coupled with Gorbachev’s other distractions during the 
period led to a scenario where Karimov rose “to power as a compromise political figure 
between regional bosses and the central government.”86  Being demoted by Nishanov had 
helped Karimov in two ways.  First, it won him the respect of local elites battling 
Moscow for control of the republic and, second, it kept him out of Moscow’s view during 
their ‘cotton scandal’ anticorruption purge that saw roughly 58,000 officials replaced, 
leaving him untainted and acceptable in Gorbachev’s eyes.  Moscow was primarily 
looking for stability in the republic by 1989 and Karimov was a communist apparatchik 
with a ‘clean record.’  Additionally, Karimov was even more acceptable to both Moscow 
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and the local elites because they believed that his lack of a strong personal support base 
would keep him dependent on them.  Regional clan leaders like Ismail Jurabekov, the 
Minister of Water Management who wanted Karimov because he is also from 
Samarkand, and Shukrullo Mirsaidov, the mayor of Tashkent and a friend of Karimov’s, 
expected to be rewarded for their support once he assumed power.87 
Early in his tenure Karimov fulfilled their expectations, as he was, in fact, 
dependent on the elites who had brought him to power.  There was not a universal 
acceptance of him occupying the position over the long-term, so he needed to build 
legitimacy by demonstrating that the informal pact between the regional elites would be 
carried out.  Initially, Karimov curried favor with a thorough de-Russification of 
appointees made by his predecessor—a move which also allowed him to begin placing 
his own loyalists in key posts.  A balance-of-power among these factions was achieved 
via their inclusion in positions in the central government and through the access to state 
resources that these positions brought.  After the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev 
in August 1991, Karimov began to consolidate his hold on the reins of power.88 
Initially this took the form of consolidating control over the power ministries in 
the republic—the military and various security forces.89  It also included sidelining 
potential rivals such as his previous supporter Mirsaidov.  Carlisle refers to this battle as 
“a struggle between two bears that could not continue unresolved much longer.”90  
Mirsaidov’s Tashkent-based supporters had only agreed to Karimov’s selection after 
Mirsaidov was tapped for the newly created position of vice-president.  Shortly after the 
August coup attempt, they once again attempted to shift power to Mirsaidov.  Karimov 
responded to this “coup” attempt by abolishing the Communist Party, which stripped 
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many of his opponents of their access to state assets.  Karimov moved directly against 
Mirsaidov by abolishing the office of vice-president.  Demonstrations resulting in several 
deaths subsequently occurred in Tashkent.  Economic conditions were cited as their 
impetus, but some analysts view the protests as a direct outgrowth of the power struggle 
between Karimov and Mirsaidov.  Karimov carried out a harsh crackdown that was a 
picture of things to come.  Mirsaidov was later jailed in 1994 for corruption and 
embezzlement, technically removing his ability to run for the presidency according to 
Uzbek law.91 
In Uzbekstan’s first presidential election in December 1991, Karimov won a 
landslide victory—in an election that was considered neither free nor fair—over the only 
candidate allowed to run, Muhammad Salih of the Erk (Freedom) Party with roughly 86 
percent of the vote.  Birlik (Unity), the party considered most threatening, had been 
banned.  Salih polled strongly only in his home region of Khorezm where he had strong 
clan support and among some of Tashkent’s intelligentsia.  After the results were 
announced, Salih challenged them charging fraud.  He was briefly arrested and has lived 
in exile since 1992.  In addition, Karimov clamped down on the Khorezm region.92 
After the election, Karimov began a concerted attempt to consolidate power in the 
office of the presidency.  A task Pauline Jones Luong believes was effectively completed 
with the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 1992.  This 
document authorized the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and his 
deputies, all judges in the judicial branch, the cabinet of ministers, all administrative 
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heads, and the prosecutor general.  The president could declare states of emergency, 
dissolve parliament, whose seats were cut from 450 to 250, and had to approve the 
Speaker of Parliament, as well as the head of the Central Bank.  The cabinet’s power was 
minimized by installing young technocrats with no power base other than Karimov.  He 
shifted the focus to executive branch advisors and to regional governors (hokims), a 
position he created to replace the regional first secretaries and one which he had the 
power to make direct appointments to.  The hokims were selected from local power 
brokers, who now owed their positions to Karimov.  Thus, elements from all regional 
elite factions in the state were essentially bought off and tied directly to his authority.93 
Only pro-government parties were allowed to register and compete after the initial 
election.  While professing that he has put Uzbekistan on a democratic path, Karimov 
was never a democrat or dedicated to political pluralism.94  He was an apparatchik, who 
opposed the dissolution of the USSR, and has subsequently “presented himself as the 
‘strong hand’ necessary to stave off domestic chaos, interethnic conflict, and religious 
fundamentalism.”95  When all of these maneuvers are examined together, Collins 
correctly asserts that “the result of his policies from 1990 through 1993 was the gradual 
transformation from a communist regime to an autocratic one, in which power belonged 
not to a hegemonic party, but to Karimov himself and the clique of clan and regional 
elites who surrounded him.”96 
a. Clan Politics in Uzbekistan 
Karimov’s lineage hampered him.  He does not come from a prominent 
family within the Samarkand clan.  This meant that, while he always had some clan 
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support, he was not a leader and had to use other methods to consolidate his position.97  
This is a significant point because “the continuing importance of clanism in the state [is] 
stressed as the most important aspect of political life.”98  Historically, most Uzbeks 
belonged to the Kipchak, Oghuz, Qungrat, Qarluq, Jalair, Barlas, Manghit, Laquay, and 
Yuz tribes; however, tribal affiliations appear to hold little, if any, value to the population 
in the post-Soviet period.  It is the clan that plays the relevant role.  The major clans 
include Samarkand (also includes Bukhara and Jizzak), Tashkent, Ferghana, Andijon, 
Namangan, and Khorezm.  As the names reveal, these are regional groupings based on 
settled agricultural areas, typically oasis cities.  In addition to blood lines and marital 
alliances, they include village and city groupings.99  “The inner relationships within a 
clan are based on principles of paternalism, hierarchy and coercion, thus forming an 
institution of government characteristic of a traditional rural community.”100  
During the Soviet period, politics was dominated by the Tashkent, 
Ferghana, and Samarkand clans.  Competition among them was fierce and each brought 
specific strengths to the table that curried favor with Moscow.  Tashkent had the largest 
number of workers, while Samarkand and Ferghana produced large quantities of the all 
important white gold—cotton.  Legislative representation was balanced in the Uzbek SSR 
Supreme Soviet between these three and their representatives held the chief power 
positions in the republic.  A break out of the First Secretaries of the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan illustrates this dynamic (see Table 1).101 
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NAME Tenure Clan 
Akmal Ikramov 1924-37 Tashkent 
Usman Yusupov 1937-50 Ferghana 
Amin Irmatovich Niiazov 1950-55 Ferghana 
Nuritdin Mukhitdinon 1955-56 Tashkent 
Sabir Kamalov 1957-59 Tashkent 
Sharif Rashidov 1959-83 Samarkand 
Inamdzhan Usmankhodzhaev 1983-88 Ferghana 
Rafiq Nishanov 1988-89 Tashkent 
Islam Karimov 1989-91 Samarkand 
 
Table 1.   First Secretaries of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.102 
As in other republics, the Brezhnev years allowed one First Secretary to 
hold power for a significant amount of time.  In the case of the Uzbek SSR, this was 
Sharif Rashidov, who held the position from March 1959 to his death in October 1983.  
Rashidov was the leader of the Samarkand clan.  He also achieved control and allegiance 
of other areas via the use of strategic marriages.  One example is the Karakalpak 
Autonomous Republic where a marriage of one of his sons to the daughter of the first 
secretary of the Karakalpak Oblast, Kalibek Kamalov, who served in that position for 
twenty-one years, cemented that region’s allegiance.  It was after Rashidov and 
Brezhnev’s deaths that the aforementioned anti-corruption purge broke out and a process 
of de-Rashidovization was attempted by Moscow.  Problematically for Gorbachev, 
Rashidov’s replacement, Inamdzhan Usmankhodzhaev, merely replaced Rashidov’s 
Samarkand personnel with his own from the Ferghana Valley.  This ultimately resulted in 
his removal under corruption charges and the installation of Rafiq Nishanov, who had 
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strong party ties and weaker clan connections.103  Nishanov was considered too Russified 
and a “slave of Moscow” by the clan elites, which coupled with Moscow’s direct 
appointment of approximately 1,000 mostly Russian cadre to the republic led to a series 
of riots to discredit him and brings us full circle to Karimov’s appointment.104 
Throughout this process of turnover, balance during the Soviet period 
remained a key issue.  Hence, a Karimov from Samarkand could rise to be the Minister of 
Finance under Usamankhodzhaev of Ferghana.  And balance among the clans remains a 
salient point.  Karimov must still attempt to balance out the competing interests of the 
clan elites.105  Ilkhamov maintains that although Karimov’s administration “is a highly 
centralized regime, it nonetheless faces serious challenges from regional elites, 
particularly those dissatisfied with post-Soviet shifts in the distribution of national 
economic resources.”106 
Reminiscent of the Soviet period, loyalty and stability are achieved by a 
balance of access to assets and the selective use of punishments—not through a mass 
democratic political process.  Pushback and efforts to disperse presidential power meet 
Kaimov’s attempts to consolidate the centralization of resource control.  Parliament is 
one example.  Although Karimov sought to consolidate his regime by minimizing clan 
representation in parliament through the creation of five pro-presidential parties, over half 
the seats continue to go to non-party affiliated elites.  Furthermore, voting districts 
largely mirror clan territorial divisions.  The primary battleground surrounds the 
institutions overseeing economic resources like the Ministry of Gold, Ministry of Oil and 
Gas, oil refineries, the Central Bank, National Bank of Uzbekistan, and the Ministry for 
Foreign Economic Relations.  Collins believes that battles over the control of these were 
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the most important political issues that confronted the Karimov regime in the 1990s.  No 
one network could be allowed to gain too much of the pie.  Additionally, maintaining 
balance is not to imply equality, as the clan occupying the First Secretary or President’s 
chair receives a larger allocation than others.  During this period, Samarkand elites 
controlled gold, oil and gas, the joint ventures, and Minister of the Interior.  Tashkent ran 
the Central bank, most joint venture banks, and defense, while Ferghana elites dominated 
the National Bank of Uzbekistan and received the premiership.  Others felt largely 
excluded.  Khorezm, still under sanction for Salih’s presidential run, was only awarded 
the Minister of Agriculture seat.  Andijon and Namangan received no cabinet seats.107 
Some analysts argue that Karimov benefits from the clan rivalries most of 
all since it allows him to play factions off of each other.  Ministers are switched 
frequently to minimize their following and to chip away at clan power bases, minimizing 
the risk of defection from the informal pact and a palace coup.  The two strongest clans, 
Samarkand and Tashkent, are balanced against each other in two of the power ministries.  
Tashkent controls the National Security Service (former KGB) and a Samarkand 
representative runs the Interior Ministry.  Karimov periodically disciplines elite figures as 
well.  As far back as 1993, he attempted to restrain the power of his own Samarkand clan, 
as their overreach was alienating the others. This move was resisted by Deputy Prime 
Minister Ismail Jurabekov, head of the Samarkand clan, who Naumkin regarded as 
Karimov’s chief promoter, “purse,” and de facto second in command.  Karimov twice 
forced him out of government—first in 1999 and finally in 2004, under criminal charges.  
Samarkand suffered a further loss as Zokir Almatov, the longest serving member of the 
government, resigned as Interior Minister due to ill health in 2005.  Tashkent also felt 
Karimov’s touch as Defense Minister Qodir Gulomov was forced to resign and 
subsequently convicted of corruption, fraud, and abuse of office, while Gulomov’s 
relative and Tashkent clan leader, Timur Alimov, was relieved of his post as presidential 
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advisor.108  While some analysts believe this demonstrates that Karimov is adept and 
successful at ‘playing the clan politics game’, some argue that “he is playing a dangerous 
game, as one of these clans is likely to overthrow” him.109  Former British Ambassador 
to Uzbekistan Craig Murray concurs that the number of people exercising power in the 
state is steadily shrinking.  He states that “there are a lot of people who used to be in the 
oligarchy…There were a couple of hundred very wealthy families who really benefited 
from the system.  That circle has got smaller and smaller and smaller as Karimov narrows 
it down toward his immediate family.”110  This engenders speculation of a violent demise 
by disaffected parties.  This is obviously not what Karimov has in mind for himself and it 
is to succession issues that this chapter now turns to. 
b. Succession 
As the International Crisis Group has stated, in Central Asia “succession 
haunts the political scene.”111  Yet, succession issues in Uzbekistan remain opaque.  
While there are constitutional mechanisms in Uzbekistan for succession, no one has any 
real faith that these will be utilized.  Elections as dictated in the constitution are likely to 
only be used to rubber stamp a preordained candidate, whether selected by Karimov or by 
other elite factions.  Moreover, Article 96 of the constitution states, “If, for reasons of 
health that are confirmed by the findings of a State Medical Commission formed by 
Parliament, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is not able to meet her or his 
obligations, within ten days, at an emergency session of Parliament, from among the 
deputies, there is an election for an individual to, for up to three months, be Acting 
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President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.  In this case, within three months, a general 
election for the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan must be held.”112  What is 
lacking is a provision for an automatic transfer of power to a specific officeholder in the 
event of the president’s demise—parliament has up to ten days to decide on who the 
temporary appointee will be.113  Additionally, while a number of names have surfaced as 
possible contenders to succeed Karimov, no clear candidate is being groomed. 
Karimov has taken some steps that could be interpreted as the beginning 
of an exit strategy.  In 2003, legislation passed that prevented former presidents from 
being required to testify and from search and seizure, as well as immunity from 
prosecution for acts done while in their official capacity.  In addition, it granted the 
president and his family members lifetime security protection.  Constitutional provisions 
make former presidents permanent members of the Senate and Constitutional Court.  
However, these should not automatically lead to a conclusion that Karimov is on his way 
out.  Technically, his current term concluded January 22, 2007—exactly seven years 
from Karimov’s previous inauguration—but Uzbek law requires presidential elections to 
be held in December of the year the term expires, effectively extending the term by 
eleven months in this case.  Even with that and the fact that his constitutional two term 
limit has long since run out, there are strong indications that Karimov has no intention of 
leaving office any time soon.  Another referendum to extend his term or a new 
constitutional provision granting him the right to run for another term may be in the 
offing.  Another option could be to restructure the government by putting current 
presidential powers in the office of Prime Minister and then shifting to that position.  
Furthermore, rumors have circulated for several years about Karimov’s supposed poor 
health.  Yet, his activities have not decreased, leading to speculation that these rumors are 
a ploy to draw out potential current usurpers and future spoilers for an anointed 
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replacement.  Some also argue that while Karimov is making provisions to step aside in 
the future, it will occur only when he is convinced that some continuity of power will be 
in place and that neither he nor his family will be attacked.  Indications are that Karimov 
simply does not have those guarantees at this point.114 
Much speculation surrounds a dynastic succession.  Karimov has two 
daughters, Gulnara and Lola Karimova.  Little is known of Lola.  She has remained out 
of the political spotlight other than chairing an organization sponsoring orphanages.  On 
the other hand, speculation rages that Gulnara is Karimov’s first choice as a successor.  
Gulnara Karimova is a graduate of the National University of Uzbekistan and Harvard 
University.  She is extremely active in Uzbekistan’s business circles with holdings in 
telecommunications, entertainment, tourism, and natural resources.  Details of which 
began to surface after her divorce from Uzbek-American Mansur Maqsudi, the former 
head of Coca-Cola’s subsidiary in Uzbekistan, in 2003.  Karimova has long worked in the 
Uzbek government.  She is currently an advisor at Uzbekistan’s Moscow embassy and a 
leader within the Liberal Democratic Party.  Karimova appears to be extremely unpopular 
with the general populace and seems to have embarked on a campaign to rectify this by 
portraying herself as a successful businesswoman rising from the bottom, poet, fashion 
designer, loving mother to two children, caring head of the non-governmental 
organization Center for Youth Initiatives, and a pop singer under the name 
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Googoosha.115  As Shermatova states, “this I’m-one-of-you style has never been tried in 
Uzbekistan before.”116  It remains to be seen if this maneuver proves successful.  Some 
argue she may prove to be a ‘lesser of possible evils,’ who can bridge the West and 
Russia, while others see her chances of succeeding Karimov as minute since Gulnara has 
made many enemies with her business practices.  Ambassador Murray maintains that 
Karimov is desperate for Gulnara to replace him.  In order to make her more palatable to 
certain elite elements unsubstantiated rumors have surfaced over time of a possible 
arranged alliance marriage to notables such as Alisher Usmonov and Sadyk Safayev.117 
Alisher Usmonov, whether in concert with Gulnara or on his own, appears 
to be a leading contender.  Usmonov, who currently lives in Moscow, is a native of 
Namangan.  He is a gas and steel tycoon, who is reputed to be among the wealthiest 
businessmen in Russia with a net worth of $2-3 billion—Forbes ranked him the world’s 
278th wealthiest person in 2006.  Usmonov owns the Kommersant publishing house and 
serves as the Director of Gazprominvestholding, a subsidiary of Russian gas giant 
Gazprom.  Speculation began to spread in 2005 that he was the leading candidate to 
replace Karimov and that Moscow was pushing this move.  Many considered this a “trial 
balloon” to gauge systemic reactions.  Others see an attempt to unite his wealth and 
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influence in Russia and Uzbekistan with Gulnara—whether by marriage or just an 
alliance—in the hope that it will make her a more legitimate successor.118 
The current Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev is another leading 
candidate.  Like Karimov, he is from the Samarkand clan.  Mirziyoyev made his career 
working in the highly important and lucrative cotton sector.  Prior to his appointment to 
the premiership, he previously served as the governor of the Jizzakh province, the home 
turf of Rashidov loyalists, and followed that with a stint as the governor of the 
Samarkand province.  With strong clan ties and a strong political pedigree Mirziyoyev’s 
positioning close to Karimov may indicate he is well placed should a succession struggle 
break out, but there are indications that he may prove an unpopular choice.  Mirziyoyev 
has a reputation for unpredictable behavior and extreme brutality.  He is alleged to have 
physically assaulted farmers who missed production quotas and to have personally beaten 
a rector, whose students were picking cotton too slow, to death.119 
Other primary contenders include key personnel from the Tashkent clan.  
The National Security Service Chief Rustam Inoyatov is a long time ally of Karimov.  
Rustam Azimov is a Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance.  Elyor Ganiyev, 
the current Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs, Investments, and Trade, has previously 
served as the Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Head of the Presidential Cabinet, and 
Foreign Minister.  Finally, Sadyk Safayev is currently the Chairman of the 
Interparliamentary Relations Committee of the Uzbek Senate.  He has held the positions 
of Foreign Minister and Uzbek Ambassador to the United States.  This slate of candidates 
has led some to speculate that the Tashkent clan has the inside track on replacing 
Karimov when the time arises.  An alternate view is that there is no true front-runner and 
the current prominence of the Tashkent clan in Karimov’s administration is only evident 
                                                 
118 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia’s Energy Risks,” 6; Stroehlein, “Uzbekistan: Beyond 
Sanctions”; International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul,” Asia Briefing, no. 45, February 
16, 2006, 3; International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter,” 1, 11-2. 
119 International Crisis Group, “The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture,” Asia 
Report, no. 93, February 28, 2005, 13; International Crisis Group, “Central Asia’s Energy Risks,” 6; 
International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul,” 3. 
 44
of a cyclic turnover among the various groupings which prevents any one from become 
too threatening or simply as they fall out of favor with Karimov.120 
All of this is not to say that an ‘outsider’ will not arise as Karimov did.  
There are many wealthy and influential individuals, organized crime elements, and 
Islamists who may make independent bids before Karimov departs the scene or 
afterward.  One thing, however, is fairly constant—whoever assumes power will need to 
suit Uzbekistan’s clan elites.121  As Kangas remarks, “practically all changes of power in 
the area currently constituting Uzbekistan in both the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras were due 
to battles among the elite, perhaps owing to regionally-based clan loyalties.”122  
Supporting this theory, Vaisman states that “in any event, the clan-geographical factor 
will influence the formation of power structures in the most important republic in former 
Soviet Central Asia for many years to come.”123  Karimov and the clan elites are locked 
in a symbiotic relationship—he needs their support and they need his patronage.  “The 
use of patronage and dependence on state resources [are] a key source of loyalty that 
makes any serious change very difficult under the present system.”124  These interests 
must still be balanced and there are causes for concern.  Trust between the clan networks 
has always been low and regime durability may decline if the size of the overall 
economic pie in the state shrinks and groups subsequently find themselves excluded.  
Ambassador Murray sees a situation evocative of Kyrgyzstan where capital is being 
concentrated in a shrinking number of hands close to Karimov and speculates that the 
“new losers” could carry out a palace coup to restore access, while Collins sees the  
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possibility of an “inter-clan war” at Karimov’s death if the economic balance is lost.  
Currently, however, it appears that the pact is holding and Karimov has the support of the 
key security personnel.125 
2. Kazakhstan 
Unlike Karimov, Nursultan Nazarbayev had a more traditional political rise.  He 
was born in Chemolgan, near present day Almaty.  After completing his technical school 
education in the Ukraine in 1960, Nazarbayev returned to Kazakhstan to work in the 
Karaganda Metallurgical Combine in Termitau where he became active in politics.  After 
stints in the Komsomol and the local communist party, Nazarbayev rose to the position of 
Second Secretary of the Karaganda Regional Committee in 1979, and later the Secretary 
for Industry of the Republic’s Central Committee.  With his 1984 appointment as 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nazarbayev effectively became the number two 
person in the republic behind Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the First Secretary.  At forty-four 
years of age Nazerbayev was the youngest chairman in the USSR.126  Sally Cummings 
maintains that as “the second most prominent Kazakh in the party, Nazarbaev must have 
had expectations that he would be picked to replace Kunaev.”127 
In 1986, at the sixteenth session of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, he 
decided to take on Kunaev, when he criticized the performance of his brother Askar, the 
head of the Academy of Sciences.  Kunaev saw this as a traitorous betrayal and sought 
Moscow’s approval for Nazarbayev’s removal.  Nazarbayev’s supporters began a back 
channel campaign seeking Kunaev’s ouster.  Gorbachev removed Kunaev, but did not 
elevate Nazarbayev.  In a move to weaken the strength of the local networks that Kunaev 
had built up over his twenty-two years as First Secretary, Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic 
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Russian with no clan ties was chosen instead, which set off three days of rioting in 
December in Alma-Ata (Almaty).  Termed ethnic riots at the time, these appear, in 
reality, to have resulted from elite pushback against Gorbachev’s fracturing of long-term 
power and resource balancing arrangements amongst clan elements.  Ultimately Kolbin 
was removed in June 1989 after another series of riots in the western part of the republic.  
He was replaced by Nazarbayev—a compromise candidate acceptable to both Moscow 
and the Kazakh clan elites.  He, like Karimov, was viewed as a balancer, who was not too 
strong personally to be a threat to the elite interest groups.128 
Nazarbayev moved to consolidate his position by replacing Kolbin’s cadre with 
his own and repairing his relationship with other key Kazakh leaders.  Bringing the 
power structures under his control included manipulating the patronage networks built up 
in the state bureaucracy, military, security, and party apparatus.  This manipulation of 
formal institutions was a tried and true method of consolidation during the Soviet era and 
Nazarbayev continued to follow suit.  Additionally, in March 1990, Nazarbayev’s 
chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet was converted to a presidency confirmed by a newly 
fashioned parliament.  This was followed up with a December 1991 election victory 
where Nazarbayev received approximately 98 percent of the vote after his chief potential 
opponent Khasen Kozhakmetov, the leader of the 1986 riots and a strong nationalist, 
failed to gain registration when his petition signatures were mysteriously destroyed.  
Subsequently, political opponents were alternately bought off with positions and/or 
access to resources, intimidated, denied registration, pushed into exile, or prosecuted for 
criminal offenses, which under Kazakh law made them ineligible for future elections.  
From 1991-1997 Nazarbayev progressively surrounded himself with a shrinking elite  
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made up mostly of family and friends.129  “The President had by 1998 managed to amass 
exclusive institutional control of his administration…Informal networks, not formal 
structures dominate[d] Kazakhstani politics.”130 
a. Clan Politics in Kazakhstan 
Daniel Kimmage and others argue that clans continue to “play a key role 
in Kazakh politics.”131  In Pal Kolsto’s words, “politics in Kazakhstan revolves around 
the bargains and maneuvers that go on among the three large subethnic groupings of 
Kazakhs know as ‘hordes’.”132  Edward Schatz pushes this even further by stating that 
“kinship ties…are a silent reality that pervades everyday life.”133  Historically, ethnic 
Kazakhs are divided into three hordes or zhus, alternately referred to as Great, Middle, 
and Small or Elder, Middle, and Younger.  Affiliation is based on patriarchal line of 
descent.  Although Kazakhs were nomadic, Soviet policies that forced them to become 
sedentary, including collectivization, resulted in these three becoming associated with 
geographical regions.  These hordes are subdivided into rus, which is roughly equivalent 
to smaller clan groupings.  The Elder includes natives of the southern parts of Kazakhstan 
and accounts for approximately 35 percent of the population.  It contains eleven 
subdivisions: Davlat, Adban, Suvan, Shaprashty (Chaprashti), Esti, Ochakti, Sari Vysun, 
Calayir, Qangli, Chachkili, and Sirgeli.  The Middle contains the largest percentage of the 
population (40 percent) and has five divisions: Gireg, Nayman, Argin, Qipchaq, and 
Qonrat.  It is associated with the northern section.  The Younger has three sections: 
Elimilu (Alimoglu), Bayoli (Bayoglu), and Ceti-ru (Yedi Urug).  It represents 25 percent 
of the population and centers on the western area of the state.   For the purpose of this 
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thesis, Schatz’s terminology of Elder, Middle, and Younger Umbrella Clan will be 
utilized in the discussion of Kazakh clan issues as this is the primary level of identity.134 
Traditional Kazakh practices dictate that the senior leader be selected from 
either the Elder or Middle Umbrella Clans, while the Younger allies itself as essentially a 
swing vote or powerbroker with the stronger side.  During the initial Soviet period, 
Moscow favored Middle elites.  However, Stalin’s later purges devastated this group and 
led to an alliance shift favoring the Elder.  The typical arrangement was for the top five 
leadership positions to be allocated with two each going to the Elder and Younger, while 
the Middle received one.  This shift also included moving the capital to Alma-Ata 
(Almaty) in the heart of Elder territory.  Like the other Central Asian republics the 
Brezhnev period witnessed the accession of a long serving First Secretary in the person of 
Dinmukhamed Kunaev from the Elder grouping in 1964.  Kunaev, who verbally stressed 
the importance of knowing one’s lineage, carried out a Kazakhification of positions 
throughout the republic.  The selection for these occurred along clan lines.135  “Regional 
leaders began to dispense political and economic favor on a clan basis within their oblasts 
and in fact were severely chastised for these practices by authorities in Moscow.”136  Yet, 
even as these attacks on this system cycled through active to merely lip service and back, 
the clan networks remained strong.  By the end of the Soviet period, Elder elites 
dominated politics, while Middle elites were preeminent in the technical professions due 
to their greater Russification.  Younger clan elites found themselves marginalized even 
though a large percentage of the natural resources lay within their territory.137 
                                                 
134 David Isao Hoffman, “Oil and State-Building in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan” (PhD 
diss., University of California-Berkeley, 2000), 244, 411-2; Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled 
Promise (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 184; Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 30-1; 
Martha Brill Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Nursultan Nazarbaev as Strong President,” In Post Communist 
Presidents, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 116; Bichel, “Contending 
Theories of Central Asia,” 74; Edward Schatz, “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity 
in Kazakhstan,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 3 (May 2000): 489-90; Bremmer and Welt, “Kazakhstan’s 
Quandary,” 140; Luong, “Ethno-politics and Institutional Design,” 93, 153; Bhavna Dave, “Politics of 
Language Revival: National Identity and State Building in Kazakhstan” (PhD diss., Syracuse University, 
1996), 62. 
135 Schatz, “’Tribes’ and ‘Clans’ in Modern Power,” 98, 110-11; Hoffman, “Oil and State-Building in 
Post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,” 245. 
136 Luong, “Ethno-politics and Institutional Design,” 153. 
137 Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 98. 
 49
In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, clan networking remains vibrant and has 
played an increasingly significant function in economics and politics at all levels.138  
Schatz points out the “explosion of interest in genealogical knowledge, widespread 
celebrations of ru and zhuz-based historical figures and monuments, and a dramatic 
increase in private and semi-public discussion of the lineage backgrounds of others all 
testify to the mounting significance of these identities.”139  Hoffman even more 
strenuously asserts this, stating that “no understanding of the Kazakhstani state is 
complete without understanding the intra-Kazakh political dynamic represented by the 
zhus system.  Although not listed on any official biography or curriculum vitae, a Kazakh 
bureaucrat or politician’s tribal pedigree can broadly delineate the limits of his or her 
potential.”140  Luong also asserts that, while Kazakhstan has the international reputation 
for being a highly centralized state, in reality the informal elements of society and the 
behind the scenes bargaining that takes place plays a major role outside of the formal 
institutional framework.  Much as occurred in the past, the central state continues to 
negotiate with regional elites on economic matters.141 
Nazarbayev, like Karimov, appeared to realize his need to maintain the 
delicate informal balance between the three umbrella clans.  This was due in some 
measure to his personal lineage.  While Nazarbayev is from the Elder Umbrella Clan like 
his predecessor Kunaev, he is from the Shaprashty subgrouping, a minor element in the 
overarching Elder framework.  The Kazakhstani political elite after independence 
reflected the same alignment practices as the Soviet period with the top five leadership 
positions distributed as follows: President and Chairman of the Senate to the Elder, Prime 
Minister and State Secretary to the Younger, and the Chairman of the Majilis to the 
Middle.  Sitting atop this vertically-oriented structure, President Nazarbayev appoints the 
regional (oblast) governors, who, in turn, make numerous appointments in their area 
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including city and district administrators.  Nazarbayev rotates the governors frequently to 
prevent them from developing independent power bases via their own patronage 
practices.  Even sod, replacements almost always come from the same umbrella clan and, 
in general, representation in the bureaucracy emphasizes clan connections.142 
Patterns of recruitment and cadre development under Nazarbayev 
represented “an effective blend of balancing clan interests, recognizing the need to bring 
in technocrats, and offering gifts to family and friends.”143  Much of Nazarbayev’s 
strategy is seen as a continuation of Kunaev’s policies.  Nurbulat Masanov claims that the 
decisive factor for core elite appointments is clan affiliation.  Cummings’ statistics reveal 
that approximately 40 percent of the core elite are from the Elder clan, while 28 percent 
are from the Middle and 9 percent from the Younger.  Elder elites typically receive 
positions of lower status on paper but with high influence.  Middle elites received what 
Masanov referred to as ‘important but not overtly political’ positions, while Younger 
elites received low profile but high status appointments.  Elder dominance at the top 
facilitated the consolidation of power in the hands of the presidential family, especially 
after foreign investment began to arrive on a large scale by the end of the 1990s.144 
“If the Elder Umbrella Clan dominated at the top, patterns in the broader 
state apparatus were more complex.”145  The Middle clan actually has a numerical 
superiority with 44 percent of the bureaucratic appointments.  The Elder follows with 43 
percent, while the Younger drastically trails with about 13 percent.  Numerous factors 
explain this situation.  First, Middle clan education levels were higher during the Soviet 
period.  Additionally, Nazarbayev’s wife, Sara Alpysovna Nazarbayeva, hails from a 
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prominent Middle family and their marriage resulted in key alliances between the north 
and south.  Her locally important uncle, Syzdyk Abishev, remained close to Nazarbayev 
until his death in 1997.  Middle elites also had bargaining power due to fears that the 
large Russian minority in their territory would attempt to secede; hence, the government 
needed their loyalty.  Middle clan influence over appointments grew after the capital 
moved from Almaty to Astana in 1997.  Finally, the influx of investment deals in 
Younger clan areas in the late 1990s led the regime to closely monitor its elites.  As a 
result, all foreign investment deals had to be routed through the capital.  At the same time 
some Younger elites were promoted to senior positions, such as Nurlan Balgimbaev, who 
served as Prime Minister from 1997 to 1999.146  Taken as a whole, “Nazarbayev sought 
to foster a degree of clan balancing.  Nazarbayev apparently calculated that, even as he 
sought to privilege his own kind and bring his family material benefit, he ought to avoid 
the most fundamentally destabilizing practices of clan-based patronage.”147  For their 
part, while clan conflict over resources remained active, no one clan group sought to 
monopolize the state to the complete exclusion of the others.148 
b. Succession 
As Ronald Grigor Suny maintains, Nursultan Nazarbayev currently “rules 
with little challenge in Kazakhstan.”149  Parliamentary maneuverings consolidated 
Nazarbayev’s position even in a potential future retirement period.  Laws passed in 2000 
gave the ‘first president’ immunity from prosecution once he leaves office, the ability to 
address the legislature and the state, the ability to exert influence over the National 
Security Council, involvement in domestic and foreign policy decisions, and a direct  
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advisory role with future presidents.150  Hence, the Law on the First President of 
Kazakhstan “ensures that Kazakhstan’s president has again used institutional resources to 
secure his power—even after he departs.”151 
Even with these protections in place and succession speculation running 
rampant, Olcott’s argument that Nazarbayev has given no indication that he will step 
down during his lifetime appears to have a foundation.  At one point the often quotable 
Rakhat Aliyev, a former son-in-law of Nazarbayev, even stated that monarchy would be 
superior to republicanism in order to maintain stability in a state still dominated by clan 
relations.  Nazarbayev has taken steps to perpetuate his current reign.  The Presidential 
age limit of sixty-five was removed.  Additionally, 2007 parliamentary maneuverings 
opened the possibility of Nazarbayev serving as president for life.  In May, a 
constitutional amendment eliminating term limits for the first president was enacted.  The 
amendment reduced presidential terms from seven to five years starting with the 2012 
elections and limits successor presidents to two terms in office, a stipulation Nazarbayev 
has successfully dodged since coming into power.  Some analysts, like Dosym Satpaev, 
see this as an ‘insurance policy’ against a crisis or state instability as Nazarbayev’s time 
in office eventually comes to an end and as a device to give him maneuver room as he 
navigates the treacherous waters of deciding who his desired successor might be.  Thus, 
the potential ‘lame duck’ dangers of a firm 2012 deadline have been avoided.152 
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Speculation endures that, in the end, Nazarbayev will attempt a dynastic 
succession to one of his progeny or sons-in-law.  He has no sons, but does have three 
daughters, Dariga, Dinara, and Aliya.  Only Dariga Nazarbayeva, an adoptive daughter 
born to his wife before they met, has shown political ambitions.  Analysts credit her with 
intuitive political skill and a good public persona.  Some believe she is figure who could 
successfully bridge the state’s elite networks.  Additionally, Dariga portrays herself as a 
candidate acceptable to both the establishment and the moderate opposition.  Her 
portfolio includes a vast media empire that contains most ‘independent’ outlets, such as 
Khabar, the largest television station, a seat in parliament, and the founding a political 
party (Asar).  In a December 2005 press conference, Dariga hinted she might seek the 
presidency in 2012, but also indicated Nazarbayev would have the final say in choosing 
his successor.  Many have long believed she had the inside track, but this appears 
debatable.  Kazakhstan has no history of female rulers.  Furthermore, Dariga’s case is 
hurt by not being Nazarbayev’s biological offspring and by having no experience or 
control in the important natural resource sector.  Asar’s weak showing in the 2004 
elections and its subsequent absorption into Nazarbayev’s Nur-Otan Party lead some to 
believe that his backing may be lukewarm.  Asar’s dissolution deprived her of a natural 
springboard into power.  Some now argue that a falling out occurred between Dariga and 
the president and that her position has waned relative to the person considered her chief 
political rival, Timur Kulibayev.  This is especially the case after criminal charges were 
brought against her now ex-husband, Rakhat Aliyev.  Compounding this impression was 
her removal from her position as Nur Otan’s deputy chairman and from the party’s list of 
eligible candidates for Kazakhstan’s August 2007 parliamentary elections.153 
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Although his fortunes have waxed and waned over the years, until mid-
2007, Rakhat Aliyev was viewed as a leading contender to succeed Nazarbayev.  His 
positioning was not hurt by his marriage to Dariga and that he is the father of three 
presidential grandchildren.  Aliyev is a trained surgeon, who has served in a number of 
government posts, including membership on the Security Council, head of the Tax 
Inspectorate, deputy chief of the state security service, deputy chief of the presidential 
security detail, deputy foreign minister, and Ambassador to Austria.  He was also 
Kazakhstan’s special representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.  Aliyev has numerous lucrative financial holdings.  His penchant for aggressive 
business practices made him many enemies and served as the excuse for what may prove 
to be his ultimate downfall.  Previous asset grabs against other elites had resulted in their 
breaking away from Nazarbayev and creating the Democratic Choice party and in 
Aliyev’s first exile as Ambassador to Austria.  His second occurred in February 2007, 
after allegations surfaced that he kidnapped executives from Nurbank—a company 
Aliyev had a controlling interest in—to force them to turn over their shares of a lucrative 
business based in Almaty.  Nazarbayev stripped him of all state titles and issued a 
warrant for his arrest in May.  For his part, Aliyev contends this is an orchestrated 
attempt to prevent him from running for president in 2012.  He claims to have informed 
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Nazarbayev of his intentions shortly before being ordered to Austria.  Aliyev had recently 
condemned the amendment removing Nazarbayev’s term limitations.  Some contend this 
situation indicates an ongoing struggle within the elite structure and that, for now, he has 
lost.  Others argue that Nazarbayev is moving to neutralize Dariga and Aliyev’s growing 
influence because they were becoming too independent from him.  Whatever the case, 
this situation potentially damaged Dariga’s bid for power and she divorced Aliyev in 
June.  This move is seen as effectively locking Aliyev out of any future political power in 
Kazakhstan.  Additionally, reformers view him as a corrupt manifestation of the 
Nazarbayev regime and are unlikely to embrace his new persona as a reformer.154 
Timur Kulibayev, who is married to Nazarbayev’s daughter Dinara, is a 
clear beneficiary of Dariga and Aliyev’s slide.  He is the son of a former regional 
communist first secretary in the oil and natural gas rich western province of Atyrau, 
which borders the Caspian Sea and contains Kazakhstan’s main harbor.  Kulibayev’s 
extensive commercial holdings are concentrated in oil and natural gas, but also include 
banking enterprises like a controlling stake in Halyk Bank, the state’s third largest, and 
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Kazkommertsbank.  Many of his business interests supposedly overlap with the 
president’s.  He currently serves as the Chairman of the Board of KazMunaiGaz, a state 
run oil and gas company.  Previous postings include the presidency of TransNefteGaz, 
which is responsible for the transport of all Kazakh oil and natural gas, the vice 
presidency of Kazakh Oil, the national oil company that replaced the Ministry of Oil and 
Gas in 1997, and leadership of KazTransOil, the national pipeline company.  Unlike 
Aliyev, Kulibayev is said to possess a pleasant demeanor and has won far fewer enemies 
during his rise.  Numerous analysts now cite Kulibayev as the leading candidate for 
succession and believe Nazarbayev will increasingly be seen promoting his position.  His 
wide-ranging experience in Kazakhstan’s energy sector could serve him well in a 
presidential posting.  One major drawback for him is a lack of control in any media 
outlets.  Some view his rise as a potential fulfillment of the traditional alliance between 
the Elder and Younger clans given his marriage to Dinara, but in this case a member of 
the Younger would occupy the senior post.  While his star may be on the rise, it remains 
to be seen if this bears fruit as others have risen only to be pushed out by Nazarbayev 
when he perceived they had gotten strong enough to become a danger to him.155 
A recent addition to this milieu is Kairat Saltybaldy, the son of 
Nazarbayev’s younger brother.  Born in 1970, he has worked as deputy head of Astana, 
first vice president of KazakhOil, and as deputy head of the anti-corruption division of 
the National Security Committee (KNB).  It is asserted his primary purpose there was to 
protect Nazarbayev’s family interests.156  His selection over a son-in-law “would be 
closest to traditional Kazakh dynastic practice.”157  Other potential candidates wait in the 
wings.  Former Prime Minister and president of KazakhOil, Nurlan Balgimbayev 
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currently serves as the president of the Kazakhstan Oil Investment Company.  
Descending from the Younger clan, he has extensive Russian ties, something likely to 
pay dividends in any succession struggle, and has built ties with younger members of the 
natural resource elite.  Almaty Mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov, a long-time Aliyev 
opponent, is likely to jockey for position should the situation arise.  While not candidates 
themselves, notable magnates like Alexander Mashkevich, Nurtai Abykayev, Bulat 
Utemuratov, Patokh Shodiev, Alidzhon Ibragimov, and Nurzhan Subkhanberdin will 
definitely be involved.158  As Dmitrii Furman put it, “they could play a decisive role in 
the inheritance struggle by allying with a Family candidate or even by supporting 
someone from outside the Family.”159  Nazarbayev could also be looking in the ‘second 
tier’ of prospects for a successor since this person would owe his position solely to him.  
The ultimate winner may not even be on the scene yet and could arise over the next few 
years.160  It is almost like Dariga Nazarbayeva was preparing the world for this when she 
stated that “we may not see this politician yet.  But we’ve seen the Russian experience, 
where [President] Vladimir Putin was unexpectedly thrust onto the political stage.”161 
As Daniel Kimmage writes, in Kazakhstan “‘the political struggle between 
[influence groups] takes place not for the electorate, but for influence over the head of 
state.’  One consequence of this is that ‘shadow politics predominates over public 
politics’…The president, then, is both a player and a referee, and while he can stretch, 
suspend, and break the rules of the game, he cannot change them permanently.  His 
power is vast, but it is limited by the need to maneuver between influence groups and 
maintain a balance between them.”162  Nazarbayev has a strong hold on power, probably 
the strongest since independence, and may prove capable of anointing a successor and 
having that individual confirmed by the Kazakhstani state.  One thing is certain, either 
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before or after Nazarbayev’s death there will successor and there is no clear heir.  The 
outcome will depend on who is selected and whether or not key clan elites back the 
decision.163  With that in mind, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that 
Kazakhstan’s “political outlook will be marred by tension over the coming years, as 
various factions seek to strengthen their position in the event of a leadership struggle.”164  
Much as in Uzbekistan, analysts view constitutional provisions with a jaundiced eye.  
Constitutionally mandated elections would likely serve only as a device to legitimize a 
pre-selected successor.  And, while Article 48 of the constitution stipulates that in the 
event of a sitting president’s death the Chairperson of the Senate—currently Kassym-
Jomart Tokayev—would serve out the remainder of the term, the world saw a similar 
provision ignored in Turkmenistan to facilitate the installation of the clan elite 
preference.165  Hence, we are left with the old phrase that the succession struggle will be 
played out like ‘bulldogs fighting under a rug.’  Occasionally, as has been the case 
recently, someone lifts up the corner to give the world a peek, but by and large it will be a 
nontransparent process that most will only see the results of when it is over.166 
E. CONCLUSION 
Power transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remains an uncertain topic.  Based 
on the literature, one thing is certain; clans will play a role in any succession scenario that 
unfolds in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, just as they did toward the end of the Soviet 
Union.  In the post-Soviet period there has essentially been an authoritarian consolidation 
rooted in the neopatrimonial tendencies of the presidents, as well as the underlying clan 
politics.  Of note, in the process of attempting to reap all they can for their respective 
followers, the participants have generated a degree of relative differentiation among the 
clans where the president and his closest associates are seen has reaping a 
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disproportionate amount of the state’s resources.  This has left some clans viewing 
themselves as comparatively deprived, but unwilling to risk what they have in hand by 
taking on the presidents in too overt a manner.  In this situation, the succession question 
takes on grand proportions.  Whoever places their representative in the position of 
president, when the opportunity arises, will gain access to the lion’s share of the state’s 
resources for their patronage base.  This virtually ensures a behind-the-scenes struggle 
among clan leaders that will likely exclude any opposition figures.167 
This has the potential to further radicalize the opposition due to the lack of any 
outlet for protest and as Sally Cummings states, potentially “sows the seeds of its own 
demise.”168  Some analysts believe that if conflict breaks out in a succession struggle, it 
will be extended, given the clans ability to mobilize followers, and violent, “driven by the 
norms of avenging kin.”169  This possibility led Collins to conclude that “perhaps the 
greatest threat Central Asians face is not the democracy deficit with which they must live, 
but the threat they face from regime instability and state breakdown.”170 
Yet, there is a decidedly conservative streak inherent in both the intentions of the 
neopatrimonial regimes in question and the clan politics that surrounds them, which 
likely mitigates that potential for breakdown.  Collins sums this by stating, “The highly 
practical nature of clan interaction and goal attainment indicates a greater likelihood that 
clan elites will arrive at agreements on the division of state resources, since, unlike 
ethnic, religious or other ideological identity groups, clans are not pursuing essentialist 
visions of the state.  In this sense, clans are less likely to be susceptible to or driven by 
the exclusivist perceptions and agendas of the identity-based political movements 
increasingly common in the post-Cold War world.”171 
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III. EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The evidence examined thus far reveals the conservative status quo tendencies 
related to the succession issue present in both regime intentions and the elite clan politics 
that plays out in each state.  The final lens to be employed in this study is Richard 
Snyder’s theory on the trajectories of neopatrimonial regimes.  The discussion of his 
work will be supplemented by other authors in the transitions genre.  Snyder posits four 
potential paths for neopatrimonial regimes: 1) revolution, 2) military rule (coup), 3) 
nonrevolutionary transition to civilian rule (democracy), and 4) ongoing regime stability.  
These headings yield eight possible trajectories (see Figure 3).  Snyder’s work highlights 
the regime’s relationship with the military, the strength of moderate regime opposition 
elements, and the strength of the radical/revolutionary opposition present in a country.  
The interrelationship of these determines the most likely trajectory.  The issue at hand is 
to determine if the current ground truth in each of these states supports the conservative 
intentions previously revealed or if those conservative tendencies are juxtaposed against a 
more radical backdrop.172 
B. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF NEOPATRIMONIAL TRAJECTORIES 
Neopatrimonial regimes rest on the executive’s ability to maintain an extensive 
patronage network, not an ideology or a legal constitutional framework.  “[The] degree to 
which the patronage network radiating from the ruler penetrates state institutions, 
especially the military, tends to be uneven and to fluctuate over time.”173  Power 
struggles often lie beneath the surface.  As a result, the relative positioning of elites and 
their followers adjusts over time and can range from “thorough cooptation by patronage 
resources to denial of such resources altogether.”174  Hence, Snyder rests his theoretical 
                                                 




underpinnings for the trajectories that neopatrimonial regimes can follow on the changes 
in the executive’s relationship with various factions in the patronage network.  To 
construct his framework, Snyder selected three variables to account for these trajectories.  
These are the institutional autonomy of the military, the strength of moderate opposition 
groups, and the strength of revolutionary groups.  Three important relationships affecting 
these variables in Snyder’s thinking are the relationship between the neopatrimonial 
leader to the military, between the leader and domestic elites, and between all the 
domestic actors—regime, military, and opposition groups—and foreign actors.175 
 
 
Figure 3.   Snyder’s Political Trajectories of Neopatrimonial Regimes.176 
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1. Institutional Military Factors 
Understanding the military’s status is particularly important to differentiate 
between revolutionary and nonrevolutionary outcomes.  The degree to which the 
executive dilutes its autonomy of action and dominates it dictates the outcome path.  
Autonomy is diluted by controlling the military’s hierarchy and placing loyalty above 
competence in promotion decisions.  In cases where key sectors of the armed forces are 
not incorporated into the patronage base, military leaders may come to view the chief 
executive as threatening to their interests, and if they are capable of independent action, a 
coup may overthrow the regime.  Military actors can also assist in the regime’s demise by 
simply withholding support at a key juncture, removing a major section of the blanket of 
protection that regimes cloak themselves with.  If no segment of the armed forces is 
capable of autonomous action, then any change tends to be revolutionary in nature.  
Snyder identifies six questions to examine to determine the degree of military autonomy.  
What level of control over the supply of their equipment do they have?  Do predictable 
career paths for officers exist or is promotion based on loyalty?  Can officers voice 
discontent to each other?  Is the officer corps divided on ethnic or regional lines?  What 
capacity does the chief executive have to purge elements whose loyalty he doubts?  Does 
the leader have a separate paramilitary force he can use to counterbalance the regular 
military and whose members he uses to spy on the regular armed forces?177 
In neopatrimonial states, the armed forces tend to resemble a “praetorian guard” 
of the chief executive.178  Characterized by low professionalism, the benefit of a career 
have little relation to the salary and benefits accorded the position and more to do with 
the ‘extra economic opportunities’ delivered by the patronage network or extractions 
from the populace.  According to Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, states 
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embodied by this model have little opportunity to develop a loyal opposition or a 
competitive political process.  Under these circumstances, armed revolution is their 
anticipated fashion of regime change and the source of any hope for eventual 
democratization.  In contrast, states that have professionalized militaries, especially when 
coupled with a strong middle class, have low success rates for revolutions.  The path to 
democracy will likely be of a negotiated or ‘pacted’ nature.179 
2. Opposition & Transition Factors 
Patronage networks by their nature favor some groups over others even if only in 
the relative degree of access to public resources and economic opportunities.  Snyder 
maintains that neopatrimonial leaders encourage or discourage the creation of moderate 
and revolutionary opposition by how they manage this process.  When patronage is 
limited to a small clique and elites are excluded from political influence and economic 
largesse, broad revolutionary coalitions tend to form.  When this is coupled with a 
military incapable of autonomous action, moderates tend to ally with revolutionaries.  
This solidarity can be preempted if the regime successfully manipulates opponents with 
selective access to resources.  This damages the development of a strong civil society.  
Yet, even exclusionary regimes are not always overthrown by revolutions since strong 
state repression can prevent the formation of effective resistance movements.180 
Foreign entities can strengthen domestic actors—regime or opposition—through 
their actions or inactions.  Robust external support for an incumbent permits the regime 
to ignore calls for reforms by allowing it to isolate itself from the populace.  Conversely, 
overdependence on a patron contributes to successful revolutions by destroying the 
leaders credibility (becomes viewed as a puppet) or by creating untenable situations via 
demands on the regime that harm its ability to maintain domestic control.  External actors 
can also undermine the regime by switching support to opposition figures more to its 
liking during a crisis period.  Thus, history shows it is in the best interest of 
neopatrimonial leaders to diversify their support base among multiple patrons.  Overall, 
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however, the literature consistently states that external forces play a secondary role in this 
drama; internal actors will determine the courses chosen and the ultimate outcomes.  The 
major exception is dominance after a wartime victory by an external power.181  Under 
peacetime scenarios, “unobtrusive but inflexible inducements and penalties are likely to 
be more effective than more fleetingly dramatic approaches, but even the most effective 
methods will only  produce results over the long haul,” and this only when the internal 
dynamics of the state are ripe for it.182 
a. Democratic Transitions 
There is an innate difficulty in transitioning from neopatrimonialism to 
democracy.  Incumbents and other elites are reluctant to relinquish their power in the 
absence of a struggle.  As a result, change tends to be forced, “either revolution or 
military coup, a fact that also inhibits immediate democratization.”183  David Brooker’s 
work on the first presidents of the Soviet successor states supports this.  He stated that 
“the manner in which a leader approached the prospect of leaving power has implications 
for a country’s democratic development because it is at the heart of the process of 
establishing the ‘rules of the game’ for a political system—creating norms and 
expectations for future leaders.”184 
Accordingly, Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor view the path to 
democracy as one of compromise when the preferences of the actors involved are 
converging, when the populace and the regime both perceive the cues that the status quo 
cannot continue or both have come to support democracy, and when the incumbent is 
able to constrain how change is implemented.  This occurs when the autocrat determines 
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it is in his best interest to exit the stage with a warranty that significant continued 
influence will be retained—a ‘pacted’ democratic arrangement.  A key component is that 
no actor has the capacity to force the others to capitulate.  The option of having some 
continued influence becomes more palatable than facing the possibility of a complete 
loss.  This may have a great deal to do with the regime’s uncertainty over continued 
support from the security services or key elites.  Consequently, the suppressive violence 
may not remain an instrument in their toolkit.  Cues for readiness to pursue this path may 
be found in studying the amount of force, or the lack that thereof, that a regime uses in 
response to protests and strikes.185 
Authoritarianism’s survival in the face of a democratic opposition is most 
likely when there are no converging preferences to build a pact on.  The regime ignores 
the signals for change from the populace and takes every measure to prevent it.  This 
coincides with a belief that it possesses sufficient support from the security services and 
societal elites to be able to maintain power in this high stakes confrontation.186  As a 
result, the regime will seek to reinforce the perception that it will strike against its 
opponents and to raise “the cost to the mass public of demonstrating its preferences.”187  
In this situation democratic actors are typically forced to relent, as the cost just gets too 
inflated for the populace to pay.  In this regard, the incumbent will do what is necessary 
to buttress its position irrespective of international opinion.188 
Additionally, there is a distinction between real moves toward democracy 
and maneuvers to shore up regime strength by liberalizing.  The two are not synonymous.  
Liberalizing may be used to answer international or domestic pressures with by giving 
the appearance of reform progress.  These moves are joined to claims that going any 
further would destabilize the state or empower some ‘enemy’ as their citizenry is not yet 
‘ready’ to handle more.  Liberalization can have unexpected consequences.  It lowers the 
perceived cost of dissent and, as individuals act in ways that were previously taboo, 
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others feel free to do the same.  The regime views these new rights are not irreversible 
and, if the situation appears to warrant their action, they believe opponents, who cross the 
line, can be repressed.  Nonetheless, liberalizing actions have a cumulative affect over 
time.  As they become in effect institutionalized, the cost of rollbacks rises, while it 
becomes more difficult to justify withholding other rights.189  While the regime’s goal 
was a “liberalized authoritarianism” without competitive elections or accountability, the 
process of starting liberalization may increase the outcry for greater democratization.190  
Secular or religious groups rise to fill the previously vacant political spaces and to test the 
new boundaries.  “Regimes quickly discover that the so-called peace and consensus were, 
at best, part of an imposed armistice.”191  There is no predetermined outcome for this 
awakened civil society.  Revolution, democratization, or regime crackdown are all still 
possible; however, Schmitter and O’Donnell maintain that in all the cases they examined 
where an authoritarian regime  transitioned to full-fledged democracy this move was 
preceded by “a significant, if unsteady, liberalization.”192 
b. Revolutions 
Turning to the question of revolutions and neopatrimonial regimes, Leon 
Trotsky’s words come to mind.  “People do not make revolution eagerly any more than 
they do war….A revolution takes place only when there is no other way out.”193  
Revolutions are not merely the offshoot of socio-economic problems in a state, but are 
also tied to violent and indiscriminate political repression.194  Goodwin argues that 
“states largely ‘construct’ (in this specific sense) the revolutionary movements that 
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challenge and sometimes overthrow them.”195  His analysis begins with an examination 
of three foundational traits: the type of state organization, the type of political regime, 
and the amount of infrastructural power.  Type of state organization concerns the 
difference between a bureaucratic/rational state and a neopatrimonial/clientelistic state, 
which was already discussed.196  The second category examines whether a state is 
classified as liberal/inclusive or repressive/exclusive.  Inclusive states allow multiple 
avenues for participation in decision-making or for voicing dissent.  Exclusive regimes 
distance themselves from popular desires, though not entirely from elites, and exclude 
groups, sometimes forcibly, from the decision-making process and from virtually all 
channels for dissent.  These regimes may hold elections, but they are little more than 
tools to justify continued incumbent control.  Infrastructural power concerns the fiscal 
resources at the regime’s disposal and its ability to confront external or internal threats, as 
well as its ability to administrate and to enforce its laws and desires even in the peripheral 
regions of the state.197 
Revolutions are more likely in neopatrimonial states that practice 
particularly exclusionary behaviors and that are infrastructurally weak.  In this situation, 
opposition figures get pushed in revolutionary directions due to the lack of other outlets, 
while the state is too weak to destroy them.  Uprisings tend to form in the periphery 
where government enforcement mechanisms cannot reach.  Conversely, revolutions are 
unlikely when a state controls its entire territory, is organized in a bureaucratic/rational 
fashion, and allows institutional interactions between the state and nonelite organizations.  
These interactions may be seen as openings to future access to decision-making power, 
which raises the potential costs of engaging in revolutionary activities.  Even though 
inclusive regimes also have dissent, it typically takes a non-revolutionary form, while 
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infrastructurally strong repressive regimes squelch revolution with their ability to reach 
out and ‘touch’ their opponents.198  As such, “neither liberal democratic polities nor 
authoritarian yet inclusionary (for example, ‘populist’) regimes have generally been 
challenged by powerful revolutionary movements.”199  Thus, a bureaucratic authoritarian 
regime has a much lower likelihood of facing a strong revolutionary movement than its 
neopatrimonial cousin due to the ability of even limited participation in the former to 
defuse potentially explosive situations.200 
Goodwin lists practices that tend to create revolutionary movements.  First 
is the “state sponsorship or protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements or 
cultural institutions.”201  Perceived regime and elite domination of key economic sectors 
falls within this category, as well as issues of religion, taxation, conscription, and legal 
codes.  Second, political exclusion makes a state appear unreformable by ordinary 
measures and devalues any approach that advocates ‘playing by the rules,’ which pushes 
people toward radical groups.202  Third is “indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state 
violence against mobilized groups and oppositional political figures.”203  In self-defense, 
opposition figures come to the conclusion that the regime must be destroyed if there is 
going to be a better future.  However, the overwhelming application of force serves to 
prevent even the formation of a coherent opposition.204  Fourth is “weak policing 
capacity and weak infrastructural power.”205  Weakness gives revolutionaries space to 
grow, whereas a state that can reach into every corner of its borders effectively to attack 
its enemies is difficult to remove from power.206  Finally is a “corrupt and arbitrary 
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personalistic rule that alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites.”207  
Moreover, once revolutionary movements form, neopatrimonial regimes have a more 
difficult time in putting them down than others.  The key is the relative unity with the 
elite and military structures.  Since the struggle for power and control over resources 
tends to play out within these groups, struggles or attempts by the chief executive to 
weaken or divide actors can create dangerous fissures in the foundation and create 
openings that revolutionaries can exploit.208 
Casper and Taylor’s research further highlights the idea that regimes come 
to face ‘critical junctures’ where they are challenged or would-be challengers see 
potential openings.  These junctures are starting points for any transition and shape the 
nature of the state for years into the future.  Succession falls into this categorization.  In 
this light, socio-economic conditions or grievances are more constraining factors of what 
is possible than determinants of outcomes in these situations.  In contrast to what some 
argue, a loss of legitimacy is not enough to determine the outcome or to specifically 
cause the downfall of a regime, since neopatrimonial regimes have low active support 
requirements.  Items that influence outcomes include the presence or absence of 
preferable alternatives, the threat and ability to use force, and elite cohesiveness.209 
Now that a thoroughgoing understanding of what the literature says about 
neopatrimonial transition issues has been established this chapter turns to the analysis 
portion.  The data related to Snyder’s three key categories, the military, moderate 
oppositionists, and revolutionary oppositionists, in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will 
be examined and then fed into his Political Trajectories of Neopatrimonial Regimes (see 
Figure 3) formula to determine what it points to as the most likely result of the ‘critical 
juncture’ of leadership succession in those states if it happened under current conditions. 
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C. UZBEKISTAN 
1. The Military 
President Karimov dominates the military, police, and national security service 
organs.  Karimov brought these ‘power ministries’ into the pact that had ushered him into 
power and over the years increasingly centralized these potential sources of danger.  Built 
on the foundation of the Soviet Turkestan Military Command that was based in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan has the most advanced military in Central Asia—although the bar is low—
and according to RAND is the regional power most likely to develop at least a few highly 
skilled elite units.  The Uzbek military is accorded the largest regional budget and 
numbers 40,000 army and 15,000 air force troops.  Its leaders appear more open to 
change than many of their peers in the region.  Doctrine adopted in 2000 identifies 
terrorism, drug trafficking, and religious extremism as the greatest threats to national 
security.  Hence, it calls for future planning efforts to focus on internal security and the 
creation of mobile, self-sustaining units.  Tasks were divided between the Defense 
Minister, who is accountable for administrative functions, and the Unified Armed Forces 
Staff, which is staffed with senior military officers and is responsible for strategic and 
operational planning activities, as well as combat utilization.  In times of crisis, this body 
controls all military and paramilitary personnel.210 
                                                 
210 International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter,” 1, 11; Polity IV Project, 
“Polity IV Country Report 2003: Uzbekistan,” Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, 2003, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/Uzb1.htm (accessed February 12, 
2007); Collins, “Clans, Pacts and Politics,” 203, 351; Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime 
Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 174; Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan: 
Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, RS21238, March 9, 2007, 4; Olga 
Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, “Sources of Conflict and Paths to U.S. Involvement,” In Faultlines of 
Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, eds. Olga Oliker and 
Thomas S. Szayna (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 335; William D. O’Malley, “Central Asia and South 
Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints,” In Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 292-3, 303-4; Roy Allison, “Conclusion: Central Asia Security in the Regional 
and International Context,” In Central Asian Security: The New International Context, eds. Roy Allison 
and Lena Jonson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 255; OxReasearch, “Central Asia: 
Perceptions Influence Military Reform,” Oxford Analytica, September 19, 2006, http://www.oxan.com/ 
(accessed April 26, 2007); International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security 
Map,” Asia Report, no. 20, July 4, 2001, 10; Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, 
Foreign Policy, and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 
130. 
 72
Karimov realized that military support was crucial to regime maintenance and it 
received considerable attention from the administration.  This led to improvements in 
pay, equipment, and living conditions to boost morale and build loyalty.  Most equipment 
and its maintenance still come from deals made with Moscow.  At independence the 
officer corps was overwhelmingly made up of ethnic Russians.  However, Karimov 
wanted it purged on Russian interests and only 20 percent are now non-Uzbeks; virtually 
all general officers are ethnic Uzbek.  A refusal to grant dual citizenship to Russians and 
increased Uzbek graduation rates from the indigenous military schools facilitated this.  
Even among the Uzbek elements, any potential rivals to the current regime have been 
eradicated.211  “Like other state institutions in the country, the Defense Ministry is 
beholden to President Karimov who appoints top-level officials and has the final word on 
policy decisions.”212  Olcott considers the military to be a functional arm for state policy 
and believes that its steady improvement, in addition to a co-opted parliament, is a key 
reason that Karimov has been able to carry out his foreign policy prerogatives.213 
Officers, as a group, remain poorly trained and lacking in experience—a legacy of 
the Soviet period, when extremely few Uzbeks became officers.  Evidence exists that the 
military remains plagued by hazing, a lack of initiative, equipment shortages (although 
most of it works), a lack of training in low-intensity operations, corruption, housing 
shortages, and low morale.214  “As a result, military service is viewed with more dread 
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than pride by many in the country.”215  Steps are being taken to rectify this.  Media 
outlets regularly tout the honor serving in the armed forces and provide extensive military 
coverage.  Troops are paid on time and, while the amount is still low, that is a rarity in the 
former Soviet states.  A cult of Tamerlane was created to promote interest in the military 
and respect for service.  New military schools were built to prepare the officer corps.  
These include the Academy of Armed Forces, Tashkent Higher General Troop Command 
School, Chirchik Higher Tank Command and Engineer’s School, Samarkand Higher 
Motorized-Artillery School, and the Zhizak Higher Military Aviation School.  Some are 
also sent to Turkey and Russia for training.  Ground forces were restructured into a 
corps/brigade/battalion configuration for increased employment flexibility.  Uzbekistan 
was the only Central Asian state to make this adjustment.  New bases are also being 
constructed around the periphery.216  At the end of the day, Karimov wants “to create a 
small but mobile professional army that is fully outfitted with the latest weapons and 
technology” and above all loyal to him.217 
The Uzbek National Security Service (SNB), the KGB successor, is a “far more 
powerful institution that the Ministry of Defense.”218  The SNB reports directly to 
Karimov and is better trained and equipped than the armed forces.  It is charged with 
protecting the regime from opposition threats.  A long-time Karimov loyalist Rustam 
Inoyatov leads the organization.  The International Crisis Group argues that it is his 
loyalty that keeps many oppositionists from making a move.  Until recently, the Ministry 
of the Interior also fit this description, but its roughly 19,000 troops have been stripped 
away and divided between the Ministry of Defense and the SNB.219  The Fund for Peace 
refers to the SNB as “one of the most brutal secret police forces in the former Soviet 
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Union” and claims that it “operates with complete impunity.”220  It appears that Karimov 
uses access to income generated by natural gas, cotton, and gold to maintain patronage 
ties to key SNB figures.  Inoyatov has heavily staffed the SNB with his supporters and it 
is for the business operations of his relatives.  To further secure his position, Karimov 
also created an elite Presidential Security Service.  Not much is known about the 
organization, but it is thought to be well trained and equipped.  These other security 
organizations are used to keep tabs on potential threats in the armed forces.  Karimov also 
uses the fact that all three report to him to play them off of each other as necessary.221 
2. Strength of Moderate Opposition Groups 
Ahmed Rashid argues that at independence Uzbekistan had the most developed 
opposition parties in Central Asia.  Birlik, which was critical of the Karimov government 
and staunchly anti-Russian, held rallies that drew thousands.  It was chaired by 
Abdurahim Polat, a computer scientist from the Uzbek Academy of Sciences.  Led by the 
poet Muhammed Salih, whose real name is Salay Madaminov, the Erk Democratic Party 
was active during this period after it splintered from Birlik in 1990.  The split was 
precipitated by Salih’s disagreement with calls for more radical measures by certain 
Birlik elites.  Salih favored operating within the existing political structures.  Erk’s 
support base consisted of urban intellectuals.  The split weakened both groups and the 
situation for opposition parties changed quickly in Uzbekistan.  By 1993, Karimov had 
crushed the democratic opposition.  The leaders of both parties were in exile, along with 
many other opposition figures, while numerous senior members were in prison.  Birlik 
and Erk have been refused legal status since that period.222  The International Crisis 
Group sums the period up succinctly: “In a span of roughly two years, President Karimov 
effectively divided, suppressed and banned his political opposition, while consolidating 
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his own position within a power structure that had adopted the authoritarian tactics of its 
Soviet predecessor.”223  Uzbekistan now consistently ranks among the least democratic 
states in the world according to Freedom House.224 
The current opposition environment has not improved.  As Martin McCauley put 
it, “there are political parties but they are merely cosmetic to please the outside 
world.”225  Only pro-government parties legally operate.  These ‘loyal opposition’ parties 
include the National Revival Party (state supported intellectuals), Liberal-Democratic 
Party (regime connected businessmen), Adolat Social Democratic Party, Fidokorlar 
National Democratic Party (youth party), and the Popular Democratic Party, which was 
established by Karimov as a successor to the Communist Party.  Designed as ‘window 
dressing’ instead of real agents for political pluralism, these organizations have little 
public support or credibility.226  “Political parties…have no noticeable influence on the 
political life of the country.”227  They are merely extensions of and rubberstamps for the 
regime.  Above and beyond their public relations role, these parties afford the additional 
benefit to Karimov of providing a forum to generate rivalry between his own 
subordinates.  Combined with election law manipulation and political intimidation these 
have effectively eliminated competition.228 
For their part, the opposition parties are weak, fragmented, and suspicious of one 
another.  Although its activists continue to seek the party’s legalization, Birlik has a 
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minimal presence and retains few supporters.  It primarily serves to enhance global 
awareness of regime abuses in an effort to generate outside pressure and to promote the 
work of human rights organizations.  Erk is in a similar state and the two groups continue 
to be divided by their rivalry.  Each accuses the other of entering into deals with 
Karimov; thus, furthering his divide and conquer agenda.  In 2005, opposition elements 
attempted to unite in a coalition called My Sunny Uzbekistan under the leadership of 
Sanjar Umarov and Nigora Hidoyatova.  Umarov is a millionaire businessman, while 
Hidoyatova led the Free Farmer’s Party.  This coalition called for faster economic and 
political reform.  Umarov was arrested and, according to some reports, kept in solitary 
confinement in a drugged condition.  Hidoyatova’s husband was killed in Kazakhstan in 
November 2005 and her sister arrested in December.  The deputy head of Birlik, 
Hamdam Sulaymonov and one of its founding members, Dadakhon Hasonov were also 
arrested.  Both Umarov and Hidoyatova received decade long prison sentences.229  
Opposition parties have not helped their own case with the populace.  They lack 
consistent, persuasive, and relevant platforms.  A crisis of confidence in the secular 
parties exists and, when tied to regime crackdowns, people are hesitant to join.  Some say 
this would be the case even if the parties were legal.230  This is in line with Kangas’ 
argument that “the likelihood of change ‘from below’ appears unlikely, at present.”231 
A small group of activists remain in Uzbekistan.  They operate in a clandestine 
manner due to risks of arrest and danger for their families.  Opposition elements are also 
not united.  This includes those in and outside its borders.232  Elite support has been what 
Olcott refers to as a “‘parlor’ phenomenon” among some mid and senior level 
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bureaucrats mostly conducted in private.  “Now, post-Andijon and the dismissals and 
arrests of a few politically prominent individuals, the closet reformers have dug down 
deeper into anonymity, venting their displeasure in ever smaller circles.”233  For her and 
Weitz this extinguishes the possibility of a ‘color revolution’ in Uzbekistan’s foreseeable 
future in spite of Muhammad Salih’s claims that the exiled opposition members can 
succeed in that endeavor.  There are similarities between Uzbekistan and states 
experiencing forced transitions.  Political repression, a lack of mechanisms for political 
change, economic hardship, and extensive corruption are common to all; however, 
revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and the Ukraine were led by elite forces inside the 
country which were married to a population willing to risk taking to the streets.  
Opposition leaders had administrative experience and a support base to draw upon.  In 
Uzbekistan, the three most prominent oppositionists are: 1) Shukrualla Mirsaidov—a 
former regime insider, who currently lives under house arrest in Tashkent; 2) Salih—the 
leader of Erk, who was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in absentia for ‘terrorist acts’ 
and currently resides in Norway and Turkey; and 3) Polat—head of Birlik, who has split 
time between Turkey and the United States.  While evidence exists that there are reform 
elements in the bureaucracy, private sector, military, and elite structures, there is no 
evidence they are organized or even aware of each other’s existence.234  Essentially, 
“Uzbekistan lacks a credible opposition movement or leader.”235 
Government policies concerning nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) further 
complicate the situation for moderate oppositionists.  As was the case with political 
parties, Uzbekistan had the most developed group of NGOs at independence.  Like the 
parties they have been decimated.  In 2004, the regime took control of NGO funding 
inside the state.  NGOs are now required to deposit all funds in government controlled 
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banking facilities, providing accurate tracking of their financial relationships.  Foreign-
based NGOs with reform and democracy promotion agendas were removed from the 
country through government suspensions and refusals to register them.  There was an 
increased effort to remove potential sources of information critical of the government and 
to silence prospective wellsprings of dissent.  NGO activists experienced surveillance, 
intimidation, physical assault, arrest, prosecution, and searches of their homes and 
offices.  Many fled the state in self-imposed exile.  Freedom House argues that the NGO 
sector is on the verge of complete elimination.236 
Civil society in general has been ravaged.  In Naumkin’s words, Uzbekistan is a 
“clan-based society with no national civil society to speak of.”237  While the state is not 
completely devoid of civil society, it is by no means a fertile field.  The reach of the 
stocks of social capital currently does not extend beyond the borders of clan and family.  
The regime has co-opted one of the traditional civil society institutions, the mahallas, into 
its power structure.  Mahallas are traditionally autonomous neighborhood groups built 
around family and Islamic ties that may comprise up to several hundred families, but 
typically does not exceed 5,000 people with most being much smaller.  A Council of 
Elders made up of six to eight individuals oversee a mahalla.  Mahallas provide local 
governance through dispute resolution, the distribution of resources and information, and 
the mobilization of members for community projects and life-cycle ceremonies.  
Mahallas now receive government funds and are used to control districts.  The regime 
also seeks to damage civil society institutions by discouraging charitable donations to 
mosques.238  Overall, while “the country’s intelligentsia and civil society groups may 
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have clear aspirations for a different political system, they are out of step with the basic 
concerns and desires of the population.”239  The regime has utilized formal and informal 
means to suppress civil society elements and create this state of affairs. 
Additionally, Karimov “dominates all three branches of government.”240  Despite 
formal constitutional separation of powers, neither parliament nor the judiciary has any 
real power or independence.  Personal loyalty to Karimov is the defining characteristic of 
both.  The president appoints all judges and can remove them at his discretion.  During 
civil trials judges are monitored by an executive agency that can bring criminal charges 
against them, which helps insure executive control of case outcomes.  There is a lack of 
public accountability for executive decisions.241  “His most important act has been to 
institutionalize presidential decrees as a means of implementing policy, effectively 
circumventing the other branches of government.”242  In what Hill and Jones refer to as a 
‘super-presidential’ system, politics in Uzbekistan is a product of back room deals made 
by vested elites.  The center grew stronger at the expense of the regions over the last 
decade as Karimov used his resource power derived from commodity exports to 
strengthen his patronage networks.243 
President Karimov regularly receives condemnation by international monitoring 
agencies for his regime’s suppression of dissent.  Unsanctioned meetings and 
demonstrations are prohibited.  Freedom of speech and the press is nonexistent.  The 
government controls the major television, radio, and newspaper outlets.  The few 
independent outlets that exist avoid political topics and practice self censorship to avoid 
difficulties with authorities.  Reporters violating this face violence, harassment, potential 
prosecution, and closure of the organs they work for.  Cimera, the media watchdog, states 
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there is not a single outlet that can present an alternative to the official view.  
Uzbekistan’s human rights record is considered abysmal with numerous documented 
cases of the killing and torture of opponents.  Human rights defenders are jailed and held 
for extended periods without charges or the right to communicate with the outside world.  
In a move harkening back to the Soviet period, some are sent to mental hospitals.244 
Uzbekistan’s Freedom House ratings of seven (Not Free) on a seven point scale in 
both civil and political rights are the worst possible.  Furthermore, the regime’s scores on 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and the Polity IV metrics place it squarely 
in the category of autocracy.  On a scale where ten is the highest ranking, Uzbekistan 
received at overall rating of 3.13, including a 2.0 in both rule of law and political 
participation and a 1.0 in democratic institutional stability.  Polity IV ranks the Karimov 
regime a nine on a ten point scale for autocracy and the lowest score of zero for the 
openness of political institutions.  Its overall grade is a minus nine on a scale where 
minus ten is the lowest Polity score given.245  In a major understatement, Quillen argued 
these indicators show that “the country is making very little progress toward democratic 
rule.”246  McGlinchey contends that “barred from traditional—and as we saw in the 
Kirghiz case—moderating avenues for political dissent, a growing number of Uzbek 
oppositionists have turned to militant Islamist movements in the hopes of destabilizing 
President Karimov’s totalitarian regime.”247  That is where this examination now turns. 
3. Strength of Revolutionary Groups 
McGlinchey further argues that domestic opposition groups alter their tactics 
based on the amount of political contestation allowed in the system.  If open opposition is 
                                                 
244 William J. Charamut II, “Policing the Silk Road: Do the Central Asian States Need the United 
States and Russia to Create and Maintain Stability?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 
22; Freedman, “Nations in Transit—Uzbekistan”; Quillen, “Democracy—A Tree Without Roots on the 
Steppes of Central Asia,” 42-5; McGlinchey, “The Making of Militants: The State and Islam in Central 
Asia,” 564; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World—Uzbekistan”; Bichel, “Contending Theories of 
Central Asia,” 68; Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,” 6. 
245 Freedman, “Nations in Transit—Uzbekistan”; Quillen, “Democracy—A Tree Without Roots on 
the Steppes of Central Asia,” 42-5; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World—Uzbekistan.” 
246 Quillen, “Democracy—A Tree Without Roots on the Steppes of Central Asia,” 45. 
247 McGlinchey, “The Making of Militants: The State and Islam in Central Asia,” 564. 
 81
allowed, then regime opponents typically utilize the existing institutions of political 
parties, civil society groups, and the media to advance their agenda and achieve power.  
When this option is foreclosed, opposition elements are more likely to seek revolutionary 
change.248  Characterizing the situation, Verme states that “for those who visit 
Uzbekistan today, it is evident that the country is dominated by fear.  The government 
fears its own people and the people fear its own government.”249  Civil discontent 
continues to rise as economic conditions for average Uzbekistanis remain on a downward 
slope.  International Monetary Fund statistics cite a poverty rate of 27 percent, while 
World Bank figures show 47 percent, with higher figures in several districts.  The 
education system is in a state of decay, the healthcare system is poor, and corruption is 
extensive.  These lead various analysts to conclude that the country may descend to failed 
statehood and become the greatest source of regional instability.  Some warn that popular 
discontent could boil over and lead to an Islamic revolution; particularly given that all 
secular opposition has been crushed and the Karimov regime remains the primary focus 
of radical Islamist elements in Central Asia.  Various commentators single out 
Uzbekistan as the only Central Asian state that truly faces an extreme Islamist or terrorist 
threat.  Indeed, Uzbekistani officials publicly espouse their view that this is the case.250 
President Karimov wrote in 1998 that “modern history has accumulated many 
facts to testify that these extremely radical manifestations give rise to serious conflicts 
and contradictions, and threaten stability and security.”251  In a country that is 88 percent 
Muslim, Karimov has unswervingly targeted radical Islamic elements as national security 
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risks.  He regularly applies the Islamist terrorism label to any opposition activities.  Over 
his tenure laws concerning religious activities have been tightened.  On paper post-Soviet 
Uzbek law enhanced religious freedom, but in reality it strengthened government control 
of the muftiate, the chief Islamic religious organ in the state, by making it the state-
controlled Spiritual Administration of Muslims.  In 1993, Karimov replaced a Namangan 
affiliated figure with one from a mosque in his home region of Samarkand.  Religious 
political parties, like the Islamic Renaissance Party, were outlawed by a 1991 law, a 
provision subsequently added to the constitution.  Sermon content is regulated, while the 
Koran and prayer are prohibited inside of prisons.  In 1998, the Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations was passed.  It prohibited proselytizing, 
religious classes in schools, private religious teaching without a license, and the wear of 
religious clothing by non-clergy.  Religious organizations are required to register.  This 
includes providing a list of all members.  A second law passed that year stiffened the 
penalties for carrying out the activities outlined above.  In 2006, Uzbekistan was listed as 
‘a country of particular concern’ on the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom annual report.252 
“Leaders have not taken pains to distinguish between religious activists, religious 
extremists, and Islamic terrorists.  Effectively, anyone who advocates the primacy of 
religious values over secular norms is understood to be ‘an enemy of the state,’ whether 
or not this primacy is to be achieved through persuasion or through force.”253  Roughly 
7,000 have been imprisoned on extremism charges and many mosques and madrassahs 
have been closed.  Numerous religious leaders are confined or in exile.  Major 
crackdowns occurred in 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2004.  The two groups typically 
named in the accusations are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Hizb ut-
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Tahrir.  While some individuals are likely intent on carrying out terrorist acts, most 
appear to simply be regime opponents or average practicing Muslims.  Public expressions 
of faith, religious clothing, and beards are discouraged.  Violators often face intimidation 
or incarceration.  Charges of extremism are often leveled by local security personnel as a 
method to extort bribes or settle old scores.  The mere possession of religious literature is 
often enough to cause an arrest.254 
Uzbekistan is the most religious country in Central Asia.  There is a general 
consensus that, if a revolutionary Islamic challenge arises, it will do so in the Ferghana 
Valley, the historic home to regional Islamic movements and the focus of militant groups 
since independence.  Challenges to both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union arose there.  
This likely played into Josef Stalin’s thinking when he split the region between 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the 1920s.  The current regime appears to 
share this view and the valley is an area of the utmost concern.  Roughly seven million of 
Uzbekistan’s twenty-eight million people are packed into an area representing only 5 
percent of its territory.  Population density is 340 people per square kilometer versus a 
state average of 53.  Sixty percent of these are under the age of twenty-five with large 
numbers entering the job market each year.  This is occurring in a region where 
unemployment is at least 35 percent.  Correspondingly, poverty is high.  Land crises, 
along with government farming regulations, add to the social unrest.255  As Rashid stated, 
“these young people are jobless, restless, and hungry, and their numbers are growing.”256 
It is not surprising then that the valley is a chief recruiting center and training 
ground for radical fundamentalists.  Rashid argues that the nightmare scenario for 
Karimov is an alliance between the Ferghana Valley clan elites and the Islamists.257  
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Karimov has concentrated on the region since late 1991 when fundamentalist members of 
Adolat took control of Namangan’s Communist Party building and called for him to 
come to the city to begin negotiations for making Uzbekistan an Islamic state.  They 
replaced imams who remained loyal to the state, assumed the functions of local 
government, and attempted to institute Shari’a law.  Karimov cracked down on the 
Islamists—arresting many and dispersing the others.  Some escaped to Tajikistan to 
participate in the civil war there under the banner of that state’s Islamic Renaissance 
Party.  The government’s continued focus on the area is exemplified by personnel 
maneuverings.  In 2006 and 2007, many senior positions, particularly in Ferghana (city), 
Namangan, Kokand, and Andijon, were allocated to security service and law enforcement 
veterans, while those lacking this background have been purged.  Furthermore, new 
religious restrictions were put in place in the Andijon province in an attempt to weaken 
religious groups.  Children are no longer permitted to attend prayers at mosques, 
employers cannot allow workers to pray at work, and mosques can no longer issue calls 
to prayer.258 
Arising from the ashes of Adolat, Islam Lashkarlari, and the Islamic Renaissance 
Party, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was created sometime between 1996 
and 1998 for the express purpose of overthrowing Karimov and creating an Islamic state.  
The IMU was led by Tohir Yuldeshev, an underground mullah, and Juma Namangani, a 
former Soviet paratrooper and the organization’s military commander whose real name 
was Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev.  Both were leaders in Adolat and its militant 
wing, Islam Lashkarlari.  They had led the Namangan Communist Party building 
takeover.  After Karimov’s crackdown in the Ferghana in 1992, Yuldashev fled to 
Afghanistan, while Namangani went to Tajikistan and fought with the United Tajik 
Opposition against the government.  The IMU established bases in Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan.  There it received training and fiscal support from the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
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and carried out operations and hostage-takings in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which led 
to its 2000 listing as a terrorist organization by the State Department.259 
The group is credited with the February 16, 1999 Tashkent bombings that 
appeared to target President Karimov.  Six bombs were set off within an hour and fifteen 
minutes of each other at government facilities—an unplanned delay prevented Karimov 
from being present at one of the sites.  Twenty-eight individuals were killed and three 
hundred wounded.  Yuldashev and Namangani were both tried in absentia and given 
death sentences.  Overall, small unit armed infiltration was its primary modus operandi.  
This was characterized by numerous border confrontations in 1999 and 2000.  Hostage 
taking and opium smuggling were used during this time to provide financial resources.  
Tajikistan was used extensively as a safe haven.  There were reports that the IMU was 
heavily involved in the Taliban’s 2001 offensive against the Northern Alliance.260  From 
March 28 to April 1, 2004 another series of attacks and bombings occurred in Bukhara 
and Tashkent resulting in the deaths of forty-seven people.  These events contained the 
first Central Asian appearance of female suicide bombers.  The incidents were claimed by 
the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), reportedly an IMU splinter—although it is possible this 
was a completely new organization.  IMU member Najmiddin Jalolov reportedly led this 
faction.  This was followed on July 30 by suicide bombings at the Israeli and U.S. 
embassies, along with the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s office.  This was the first targeting 
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appeared tied to prosecution efforts for the March-April events.  The IJG was 
subsequently added to the list of specially designated global terrorists by the U.S. State 
Department.261 
Numerous IMU members were killed or dispersed during Operation Enduring 
Freedom while fighting alongside the Taliban.  This list includes Namangani, who was 
killed at Kunduz in November 2001.  There is speculation that Yuldashev is currently 
hiding somewhere in Pakistan.  Overall, observers contend that the organization’s 
capabilities are thoroughly degraded and its ability to successfully reconstitute is an 
object of contention.  Rashid doubts its ability to rebuild, while a RAND study argues 
that it may at least regain the ability for small-scale actions.262  Jeffrey Smith argues that 
“the actual threat of the IMU may be small and its chances for success even smaller.”263  
What is more, the IMU contingents located in the tribal areas of Pakistan appear to face 
pressure from local militias who also support the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  Clashes broke 
out near Wana in March 2007 between Pashtun tribesmen from South Waziristan in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas and IMU affliated Uzbek militants.  Pakistani 
military units may also have participated on the side of the tribesmen.  The official death 
toll was approximately 170.  Fighting allegedly broke out after the Uzbeks killed some 
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Pakistani tribal leaders they accused of spying for the government.  Somewhere between 
1,000 and 2,000 IMU fighters are said to be located there.264 
There are reports that the IMU is regrouping in the Ferghana Valley for future 
operations, but the actual level of support it retains in Uzbekistan is unknown.  The brand 
of Islam it advocates has not been historically embraced.  However, it does have a social 
basis to undermine the regime with based on its ability to exploit state-society conflicts, 
such as the low standard of living.265  According to Akbarzadeh “people rarely joined the 
IMU in the name of an ideal—it was a step they took mainly because of their poor living 
conditions.”266  He argues that the group’s potential to create chaos in the region and 
pursue its goals was vastly overstated all along.  Essentially, they never represented a real 
threat to the Karimov regime.267  Naumkin simply states that no one knows if the IMU 
can, or already has, resurfaced as an organizational force capable of recruiting 
extensively and conducting violent operations.268  The attendant risks of government 
reprisal for supporting the IMU have risen to even greater levels.  This may lead potential 
recruits to move toward Hizb ut-Tahrir, which, although illegal throughout Central Asia, 
much of the Middle East, Germany, and Russia, has not been designated a terrorist 
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trafficking.269  “Whereas the IMU largely discredited itself in the public eye because of 
its violent approach, [Hizb ut-Tahrir] is gradually presenting itself as the only viable 
opposition to the present ruling elites.”270 
Founded by Sheik Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a Palestinian Sufi scholar, in 1953, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir (HT) spread to Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union.  The 
organization’s regional goal is the overthrow of the current Central Asian governments 
and their replacement with a transnational Caliphate.  It espouses non-violence and 
appears to believe its membership will eventually grow to sufficient levels to achieve this 
objective through peaceful means.  On the other hand, HT’s rhetoric grew more militant 
in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom, calling on Muslims to mobilize, rise up, 
assist the Taliban, and defend themselves against the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Israel.  HT is hierarchical and cellular in nature and observes strict rules of secrecy.  It 
operates in five member cells and only the leader knows the head of the next echelon.  
Some compare it to the pre-revolutionary Bolsheviks in methods and aims.  While the 
IMU’s primary recruiting ground is the rural farm communities, HT support stems from 
the urbanized intelligentsia, especially students and teachers.  This base is expanding, 
particularly in the Ferghana Valley, as urban members recruit rural farmers.  Its message 
of social justice and Islamic unity resonates among the young, who are particularly 
alienated from Karimov’s regime by failing economic prospects.  The majority of its 
projected Central Asian membership of 15,000-20,000 is made up of Uzbeks and the 
groups popularity among them continues to grow.  While it does not appear to have 
carried out any violent operations in Uzbekistan, HT members were previously 
implicated in coup attempts against King Hussein II of Jordan and its literature calls on 
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the faithful to take up arms when the emir calls on them to do so.271  Zeyno Baran 
contends that “by combining fascist rhetoric, Leninist strategy, and Western sloganeering 
with Wahhabi theology, HT has made itself into a very real and potent threat.”272  As 
such, speculation persists that HT’s Central Asian contingent will eventually move 
against the Karimov regime, while others doubt its capability to do so and see the greatest 
threat in HT’s members being co-opted by another organization seeking to foment 
revolution.273 
The International Crisis Group contends militant Islamic movements found an 
infertile ground in the Russified, secularized Uzbekistan that emerged at independence.  
Studies showed political Islam to be moderate at that time.  While Uzbekistan contained 
the most religious Central Asian population, most citizens had limited knowledge of 
Islamic precepts.  This was particularly the case among the younger stratum.  Interest 
was, nonetheless, on the rise and Uzbekistan contained many historic Islamic cities, such 
as Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva.  Conversely, few citizens indicated a preference for a 
politically active variant.  However, elements of the new landscape affected that state of 
affairs.  Popular discontent with declining living standards with no improvements in 
sight, government corruption and abuses, and the crushing of secular opposition modified 
the ground truth to some extent.274  “The role of Islam in political life is 
increasing…because religious protest is the only form of dissent left after the 
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criminalization of secular dissent.”275  Islam became a security issue largely because 
Karimov made it that way through repression.276  As Rashid astutely observes, “having 
crushed a democratic opposition, he has driven his opponents underground, particularly 
Islamic militants based in Ferghana.”277 
Islamic extremism became the boogeyman of his regime—the label is applied to 
any opposition and any citizen mobilization is seen as a security threat.  While it is true 
that Karimov overstated the threat to justify repressing opponents, the danger was not a 
complete illusion.  As IMU operations proved, there was a threat.  Analysts have labeled 
the Ferghana Valley a time bomb of discontent, whose explosion could rock the entire 
region.  Virtually every family network in the area has been touched by the mass arrests 
there.278  Religious activity in general came to be viewed as a source of potential regime 
enemies.  Islam was the particular focus, but other groups such as Protestant Christians 
and Hare Krishnas are also repressed.  Foreigners participating in religious activities are 
frequently deported.  The numbers allowed to make the Hajj each year are kept below the 
amount allocated to the state by Saudi authorities and madrassahs are no longer given 
permission to open.  This is part of a strategy to suppress religious sentiment among the 
young.279  In pursuing these activities, “Karimov depicts himself as protecting the 
motherland, not just his regime, from subversion and terrorism and as maintaining the 
political stability that prevents radical Islamist groups from seizing power.”280  His 
strategy is viewed as risky and there is little doubt that the regime’s policy of repression  
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aides rather than hinders the recruiting efforts of revolutionaries in a state where half the 
population is under twenty-one and rural educational systems and economic prospects are 
deteriorating.281 
Even given these conditions, supporters of political Islam and active radical 
Islamists remain a small minority.  The majority of practicing believers remain attracted 
to the region’s traditionally moderate Hanafi teachings, surprising many analysts, who 
expected the harsh conditions to stimulate large numbers of radicals to action by now.  
Yet, the IMU never gained a wide following and, as Mihalka highlights, neither HT nor 
any other Islamist element rose out of the Ferghana to exploit the turmoil of the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan.282  Nevertheless, Olcott believes that “there is a process of 
‘globalization’ going on among Uzbekistan’s believers, which is working to the 
advantage of those advocating more radical forms of Islam.”283  Salafists and revisionist 
Hanifists are gaining ground.  The latter has members in the state sponsored clerical 
organization.284  McGlinchey builds on this by arguing that a growing number of 
moderate regime opponents feel they have little choice but to support “the revolutionary 
agenda of the IMU and HT” since they have been barred from all forms of political 
participation.285  Another danger is that average citizens may come to believe that “one 
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the underground Islamists.”286  At a minimum, repression and economic difficulties may 
simply cause them to ‘turn a blind eye’ to insurgent actions, which has historically 
magnified any revolutionary threat.287 
D. KAZAKHSTAN 
1. The Military 
Kazakhstan’s armed forces are thoroughly co-opted by President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s regime.  A combination of weak ministers, who may or may not be 
qualified but are loyal to Nazarbayev, and frequent turnover has insured that the Ministry 
of Defense (MOD) remained in his grasp since before independence.  Cummings presents 
this as a consistent presidential strategy.288  “The President used elites to weaken 
institutions, particularly by appointing a weak Minister, a mere figurehead or the 
proverbial dummy in a shop window, to a traditionally strong Ministry.”289  Nazarbayev 
also chairs the State Security Council.  This body makes all decisions related to defense 
and security policies, as well as all senior military appointments.290 
Analysts currently view Kazakhstan’s military as the second strongest in Central 
Asia—behind Uzbekistan.  However, this was not always the case.  In the mid-1990s the 
Ministry of Defense had little prestige due to its small size, a funds shortage stemming 
from a weak economy, the absence of an external threat, an inability to enforce 
conscription, and the fact that the state gave up its TU-95 Bear bombers, air-launched 
cruise missiles, and nuclear weapons stockpile of 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and 1,040 warheads.  State officials were disinclined at that time to maintain 
anything beyond a National Guard force of 20,000 troops.  Furthermore, at independence 
the officer corps was 97 percent ethnic Russian—only 3,000 ethnic Kazakh officers were 
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in the entire Soviet Army and none commanded a division, army, or military district.  
Seventy percent of the officers left for other republics.  Shortages of qualified officers 
remain a problem today.  Officer training schools at the Academy of Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Air Force School, Military Academy of Civic Aviation, and the 
Navy College are attempting make up the shortfall.  In addition to indigenous training, 
five hundred Kazakhstani officers are trained in Russia annually, while a small number 
goes to Turkey and Germany.  Officers were also brought in from the various internal 
security organs to help fill the gap.  The present force is much smaller than the six Soviet 
divisions once stationed in the republic.  Initial planning envisioned a force equal to one-
half of one percent of the population or roughly 83,000 in all branches; however current 
manning rests at 65,800 divided between ground and air defense components, along with 
a small naval force of 3,000.  Corruption, hazing, looting, and desertion remain problems.  
Military service is not viewed with a high degree of prestige.291 
The current National Security Strategy and military doctrine, adopted in 2007 and 
2000 respectively, focus on responding to “existing and potential sources of armed 
conflict in close proximity to the border of the state, possible infiltration of the territory 
of the country by armed formations of extremists and international terrorists, and the 
appearance of new nuclear powers in the region.”292  Four military districts were 
established.  Priority was given to the southern one as major concerns for the 
administration are the possible infiltration of Islamist extremists from that direction and 
periodic tensions on the Kazakh-Uzbek border.  The Western district is considered 
second most important due to the petroleum resources located there and concerns over 
Caspian Sea security issues.  Military reform efforts signed in 2003 focus on the creation 
of mobile forces, along with equipment modernization, improving training, and procuring 
air defense systems.  Defense spending was a low priority during the first decade of 
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independence.  As a result of improving economic fortunes, recent years witnessed a rise 
in funding for that arena.  Military expenditures remain the lowest in the region at 0.9 
percent of the state budget.  While in pure dollar terms it is the largest amount in Central 
Asia, this is not a level that will not likely allow the achievement of the objectives stated 
above.  Most equipment remains Soviet/Russian in origin.  The U.S. Excess Defense 
Articles program has been used to transfer some American equipment to Kazakhstan as 
well, but this remains a minute piece of the whole structure.293  William O’Malley of 
RAND sums up that “Kazakhstan is just now seriously beginning a reform and 
restructuring process, but it is a least five years behind Uzbekistan and is unlikely to 
catch up in the next decade…real improvements will be limited to a few elite, combat-
ready formations…Low-tech, poorly trained units will likely remain the norm.”294 
Nazarbayev also created a Republican guard that directly reports to him in 1992.  
This organization contains approximately 2,500 personnel.  A Government Guard 
includes another 500.  The Ministry of the Interior now controls the 20,000 troops that 
previously made up the Soviet internal forces.  Its mission is to maintain public order and 
suppress internal disturbances.  A border guard force of 12,000 answers to the National 
Security Committee (KNB), except under a declared crisis when it is attached to the 
Ministry of Defense. The KNB controls Special Forces ‘Arystan’ and ‘Barlau’ units as 
well.  Cummings claims that the key strategic security questions are dealt with by the 
KNB, which is answerable only to President Nazarbayev and grew out of the Soviet era 
KGB organization in Kazakhstan.  The budget for all of these paramilitary forces equals 
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natural resource wealth is said to have been effectively utilized to ensure the loyalty of 
these groups.  They, in turn, monitor elite circles, the general public, and the military for 
potential regime rivals. 295 
2. Strength of Moderate Opposition Groups 
David Hoffman’s words sum up the current state of Kazakhstan’s moderate 
opposition.  “The Kazakhstani political arena is characterized by President Nazarbayev’s 
unwavering grip on power, and the resultant chill in pluralism and political 
liberalization.”296  Nazarbayev and his party associates have won every presidential and 
parliamentary election of the post-Soviet period.  While better than Uzbekistan’s rating, 
Kazakhstan’s 2006 Freedom House democracy score of 6.36 on a scale where seven is 
the worst rating represents a consistent decline and falls under the category of not free.  
This score has dropped every year since the state received a 5.3 in 1997.297  “Stability has 
been the watchword of the regime, and the ruling elite has viewed democracy as 
anathema to stability.”298  This stemmed from fears that the emergence of parties would 
cause the birth of ethnically aligned parties and interethnic conflict and that it would 
herald the emergence of a counter-elite.  Constitutional maneuverings sanctioned a 
growing concentration of power in the president’s hands.  Overall, a political culture 
based on personality was created due to the lack of democratic norms, rule of law, or 
institutional development.  One’s power and opportunity are defined by one’s 
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relationship to the regime elite.299  “There is no conception of the state or nation separate 
from the person of the President; officials are the President’s servants, not the 
nation’s.”300  This comes at the expense of legislative and judicial institutions.  Checks 
and balances are basically nonexistent.  While the legislature can nominate and pass laws, 
it is dominated by Nazarbayev supporters.  It and the judiciary are regime rubberstamps.  
Transparency in the judicial system is lacking throughout, but political cases are 
particularly problematic.  Compounding presidential control is his power to dismiss the 
prime minister, to appoint regional and district governors, and to directly remove any 
judge except a member of the Supreme Court.  As a result, Freedom House awards 
Kazakhstan a rating of only 6.25 in the category of constitutional, legislative, and judicial 
framework independence.301 
Opposition figures and parties are not in a position to challenge the regime.  Their 
actions are tightly restricted and controlled.  Both physical and legal attacks have been 
used to bring this about.  As Rashid identifies, the state reaction to oppositionists 
progressed through a cycle starting with harassment, then suppression, and culminating in 
incarceration or exile.  Election authorities regularly deny registration to parties such as 
Ak Zhol and the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (now Alga! or Forward!).  Leaders 
attempting to challenge the regime often find themselves with unrelated legal offenses.  
Additionally, some opposition figures have met mysterious deaths.302  Registration laws 
from 2002 made organizing opposition parties even more difficult.  These require a 
minimum of 700 members in every province, 50,000 signatures (old law required 3,000), 
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and mandated that the organization must have previously competed in two successive 
parliamentary elections.  Of the twelve parties participating in the 2004 parliamentary 
elections, nine were pro-presidential.  These were identical in platform, but targeted 
different societal sectors.  Since 2004 only one opposition figure occupied a seat in the 
legislature, Alikhan Baimenov of Ak Zhol.  Until late 2006, he had refused to actually 
take up the seat he won in protest.  However, that seat was lost in the August 2007 
parliamentary elections, as Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan won all seats with 88 percent of the 
vote.  No other party was officially reached the 7 percent threshold for representation.303 
Commentators state that most leading opposition figures originate among the 
Middle Umbrella Clan and among businessmen.  This is ascribed to discontent growing 
out of the domination of the Elder clan around Nazarbayev.  Clan interests promote the 
adoption of liberal ideas as a venue for competition, while business interests want to see 
the state’s economy opened up to further investment and competition.304  Opposition 
parties suffer from internal fracturing and distrust between organizations, which hampers 
their effectiveness.  Frequent party splintering, such as a faction of Ak Zhol creating 
Nagyz Ak Zhol in 2005, results in splitting of what opposition votes there.  Some 
maintain the regime actively promotes the formation of splinter parties to keep the 
opposition weak.  What is more, a wide gap between the general populace and the parties 
appears to exist.  While the oppositionists focus on political reform, average citizens want 
standard of living issues addressed.305  Perhaps an even greater problem is the image 
issue.  “Many of the new opposition leaders have been timeservers in the regime they 
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now criticize and many are also engulfed in corruption scandals.”306  A number have 
simply been co-opted into the regime’s patronage network.  Kazakhstan’s immense size, 
widely dispersed population, and the north-south divide makes campaigning difficult, 
while the opposition lacks a coherent marketable message.307 
Freedom of the press is ensconced in Kazakhstan’s constitution.  Nonetheless, 
free media is virtually nonexistent.  Freedom House scores independent media a 6.75 and 
161st of 193 countries in the world.  This situation continues to deteriorate rather than 
improve.  Outlets not controlled by presidential family members or close associates must 
practice self censorship or risk prosecution.  Charges of ‘offending the dignity of the 
president’ are regularly leveled against anyone attempting to discuss election fraud or 
political corruption.  At one point Dariga Nazarbayeva had controlling positions in both 
Karavan and Khabar, the largest newspaper and television station in the state.  The state 
owns most printing and signal transmission facilities.  These resources are utilized to 
promote regime candidates, while opposition parties are denied access.  There are 
allegations that pro-opposition journalists are physically assaulted or financially harassed.  
The regime’s technical skill in preventing access to websites is also growing.308  
“Amendments to the Law on Mass Media give courts far greater latitude to close down 
media outlets for ‘violating Kazakhstan’s integrity,’ condoning ‘extremism,’ and 
‘undermining state security.’”309   
Civil society scores follow a downward trajectory with a current rating of 5.75.  
Street demonstrations are high of the regime’s priority list after Akayev’s overthrow in 
Kyrgyzstan.  Rallies are broken up by police and the leaders are arrested for illegal 
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gatherings.  NGOs also find themselves under pressure.  According to laws adopted in 
2005, foreign individuals or organizations are prohibited from participating in or 
supporting activities within Kazakhstan that seek to affect the process of nominating 
political candidates, while indigenous NGOs that advocate reform or civil liberties 
encounter government resistance through state inspections and monitoring.  Much of the 
regime’s increased targeting of civil society and opposition figures can be attributed to 
fears of a forced removal from power by another ‘color revolution’.  Preparations were 
made for just such an occurrence during the December 2005 presidential election, which 
Nazarbayev won overwhelmingly with 91 percent of the vote.  Oppositionists maintained 
that the results were fraudulent, yet no protests erupted and this outcome does not appear 
to have grown more likely in the intervening period.  Prior to the election, weapons 
distribution to police elements increased, protests during the election cycle were banned, 
and foreign press and NGOs were restricted.  Nazarbayev frequently stated that no repeat 
of events in Bishkek would be permitted.  Besides the security institutions, there are other 
facts hindering the development of a popular uprising.  The state is relatively prosperous 
and prospects are improving.  Natural resource wealth allows many potential 
‘troublemakers’ to be bought off.  In addition, unlike tiny Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is four 
times the size of Texas with less than three times the population of Washington, D.C.310  
“Kazakhstan’s poor are relatively dispersed across the country’s enormous territorial 
expanse, making them much more difficult to organize.”311 
Moreover, instead of relying only on force, Nazarbayev utilizes a variety of tools.  
State patronage, media control, legal manipulations, fraud, and clan loyalties are enlisted 
in this quest for regime preservation.312  “Whereas Karimov has pursued a scorched earth 
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strategy in Uzbekistan, seeking to destroy any and all opposition he confronts,” the 
Kazakh executive has “been more selective, working to eliminate only those political 
rivals who pose an immediate threat to the autocratic status quo.”313  The journalist Paul 
Starobin said that he went to Kazakhstan in search of information on a despised dictator, 
but instead he found one that was tolerated and even popular, an impression shared by 
other commentators.  Political reforms did not strike him as at the top of the populace’s 
priority list.  While there are restrictions, they appeared to see themselves as better off 
than their neighbors in Central Asia.  Others mirror these remarks.  Nazarbayev remains 
popular and many believe he will continue to deliver on the economic policy front.314 
Additionally, in the Bertelsmann Foundation’s view, Nazarbayev is aided by a 
situation where “most people in Kazakhstan possess a highly vague understanding of 
democracy and how it should work.”315  What is more, while Nazarbayev’s family has 
made tremendous personal fortunes, they, unlike many neopatrimonial regimes, typically 
operate with some restraint that allows others outside their immediate circle to have a 
chance to make money as well.  State development continues, not state stripping.  For 
this, and other reasons, most elites are not ready to break ranks with Nazarbayev.  Many 
elites inclined to seek reforms are young enough to wait for gradual openings to have an 
effect.  There is a feeling that Nazarbayev navigated the state through a difficult time at 
independence and gained western economic involvement without becoming estranged 
from Russia.  The elites are not looking to unseat Nazarbayev, but want continued 
economic growth, measured institutional development, and an opportunity to compete 
when he does leave the scene.  The ranks of those holding this sentiment appears to be 
growing.  This line of thought coincides well with Nazarbayev’s actions and strategies.  
Soon after the Tulip Revolution occurred in Kyrgyzstan, he announced a 32 percent rise 
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in pay for government employees.316  Essentially, as Cummings argues, for his part, “by 
concentrating on the economy, Nazarbaev is gambling to buy off the opposition by 
improving living standards.”317  This goes hand in hand with the reality that “in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan, private interests are not deep-rooted or well-protected by law.  None 
of them are strong enough to stand out against the state or protect themselves from it.”318 
3. Strength of Revolutionary Groups 
a. Secessionism 
In the immediate post-independence period, potential secessionism in the 
northern section of the state was at the forefront of revolutionary concerns.  This was due 
to Kazakhstan’s unenviable position as the only new state in the region where the titular 
nationality was not a majority of the population.  A Soviet census in 1989 showed that 
Kazakhs accounted for only 38 percent.  Ethnic Russians were the majority in the north, 
which was closely tied to Russia economically and tightly integrated with the Siberian 
cities just across the border.  Many viewed the northern Kazakh steppe as rightfully part 
of Russia.319  In 1996, Olcott highlighted this when she stated that “the threat of 
secession is so obvious that it does not need to be stated, and it is viewed as so calamitous 
that no serious politician in Kazakhstan dares speak of it in public.  When anyone does 
mention changing Kazakhstan’s borders…the political climate in the republic becomes 
almost hysterical.”320  Examples of this nationalist sentiment were comments made by 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky during his 1993 campaign and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel 
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laureate, in 1990 and 1994.  Both called for all or significant parts of Kazakhstan to be 
reincorporated into Russia, sentiments shared by some Russians living in the region.321 
Jorn Holm-Hansen detected both indifference and resistance among ethnic 
Russians to Kazakhstan’s independent status.  Some held that Russians had brought 
civilization to Kazakhstan and, as such, it had no right to exist separately.  More appeared 
to believe that the northern regions, which had been populated by Russians for an 
extended period, simply belonged in the Russian state.322  Holm-Hansen’s field research 
in 1999 determined that “the words ‘us’ and ‘our President’ could just as easily mean the 
Russian Federation and Boris Yeltsin.”323  During the Soviet period the two ethnic 
communities occupied different elite strata in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.  
Russians dominated economic positions, while Kazakhs were preponderate in 
government.  After the USSR’s demise, Kazakhs parlayed their political positioning into 
economic power as they took over the newly privatized state-owned enterprises.  This led 
to complaints of oppression and fears that Kazakh nationalism, Islam, and the Kazakh 
language would increasingly threaten Russian’s way of life.  One data point utilized to 
argue for a charge of discrimination is that, while they constitute 30 percent of the 
population, only 8 percent of government positions are in Russian hands.324 
Russian complaints about bureaucratic representation accurately reflect 
their declining role in government posts.  In 1994, Russians held 21 percent of these jobs, 
while by 1995 that number fell to 14 percent and the decline continued.  Making this 
more apparent was the Kazakhs disproportionate share in Russian oblasts (regions)—an 
attempt by Nazarbayev to ensure control over those areas.  Voting districts were also 
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gerrymandered to ensure a high percentage of Kazakhs occupied parliamentary seats, 
while regional boundaries were redrawn to increase Kazakh percentages in heavily 
Russian oblasts.  Realizing the precariousness of his early situation, Nazarbayev did not 
pursue Kazakhification with reckless abandon—his actions were measured to prevent a 
backlash.  The president understood nationalism’s dangers and crushed its manifestations 
both among Kazakhs and Russians.  Ethnically-neutral policies like the redistribution of 
petroleum tax wealth from the regions of origin to those lacking resources irrespective of 
ethnic composition were carried out.  Some say the secessionist threat prompted 
Nazarbayev to move the state capital from Almaty in his southern Elder clan stronghold 
to Astana (formerly Akmola), which lies in Middle clan territory.  This had the dual 
effect of permitting the government to keep a closer eye on developments in the region 
and encouraging Kazakhs to migrate north.  Another key factor was Nazarbayev’s clear 
understanding of demographic realities.  Kazakh birthrates far outstrip Russian figures—
time was on his side.325 
The Slavic Union Lad party was the strongest Russian nationalist 
organization.  It ran afoul of laws banning parties with a regional, ethnic, or religious 
orientation.  Lad seeks to counter what it views as Kazakh attempts to turn Russians into 
the equivalent of ‘guest workers’ in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.  It also assists Russians 
wanting to emigrate or acquire Russian citizenship navigate the bureaucratic hurdles.  
Ust-Kamenogorsk has been one of the tensest cities related to the ‘Russian’ issue.  
Twenty-two separatists led by Viktor Kazimirchuck of the Rus Patriotic Movement were 
arrested there in 1999 on a charge of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and overthrow 
the government with the intent of establishing an autonomous republic in the north. 
People of both sides expected a heated response from Moscow, but in reality only quiet 
diplomatic protests resulted.  Of note, very few Russians in Kazakhstan itself expressed 
sympathy for this group.  Most complaints that arose simply surrounded the belief that  
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their sentences were too harsh, which led to later reductions.  A number of Russian 
nationalists remain active with groups inside Russia’s borders and advocate for their co-
nationalists.326 
While the Cossack threat was largely overstated, they also asserted their 
right to a homeland in the far west near the Volga.  The former chieftain of the 
Semirechie Cossacks, Nikolai Gunkin, who was imprisoned for three months in 1995 for 
his political activities, did not accept the end of the Soviet Union and viewed himself as a 
defender of Russian rights.327  Gunkin referred to Kazakhstan as “a ‘fascist’ state that 
endorsed ‘genocide of Russians’.”328  Cossacks were banned from creating militias inside 
Kazakhstan, but those seeking to train crossed the border with Russia, where their 
activities are legal.  While Cossacks enjoy a special status and state-sponsored cultural 
revival in Russia, their relationship with the Kazakh government remains strained.  
Cossacks seek recognition as a distinct ethnic group, while the government only 
recognizes them as a social and political group; thus, negating any pretensions to a right 
of self determination.  While Gunkin’s arrest generated heated remarks in the Russian 
Duma and press, as well as some nationalist outcries, the Cossack issue has not generated 
the firestorm of support that he sought.  Overtime, as the government has become more 
confident in its position, some openings have occurred.  Cossack groups were allowed to 
register as NGOs as long as they do not attempt to advocate secession.  They have also 
been allowed to wear uniforms and conduct cultural activities.329 
Ethnic Russians ultimately voted with their feet, as 1.5 million left for the 
Russian Federation between 1992 and 2000.  Overall, however, researchers found that 
only 13 percent of all ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan actually viewed the Russian 
Federation as their ‘homeland’ and only 6.6 percent believed that there was a chance that 
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the Kazakh state might become extinct, which was good news for Kazakhstani officials 
fearing irredentism.  Two factors ameliorate the issue.  Firstly, the Russian language 
continues to be almost universally spoken and, second, Russians continue to have 
numerous economic opportunities in Kazakhstan, especially in the technical and natural 
resource fields.  Also, unlike many states that have experienced ethnic conflict, in 
Kazakhstan the groups have not completely self-segregated in the public sphere and 
continue to commingle.  Besides, ethnic Russian protests have thus far been unsuccessful 
in generating a strong response by Moscow.  Jim Nichol believes the threat of separatism, 
while real in the past, is now diminished given these factors.330  John Clark agrees with 
this as long as ethnic Russians continue to have economic opportunities and “are not 
treated in a demeaning manner by the state.”331  Olcott simply argues that, while it is 
likely that a majority of Kazakhstan’s Russians would support secession, “there has never 
been strong evidence that Russian nationalist groups (including the Cossacks) pose a 
serious threat to the Kazakh state.  While Russian nationalists within the Russian 
Federation are vocal on the need to support ‘compatriots’ living in Kazakhstan…the fate 
of these ‘stranded Russians’ has never been a major campaign issue of mainstream 
political figures.”332 
For his part; however, David Hoffman does not perceive secession as “at 
all far-fetched, especially given the occasional calls of both sides of the border for a post-
Soviet Anschluss among Slavs.”333  Most secessionist support was driven underground 
by government action and its illegality, which makes an accurate assessment of support 
difficult.  While most Russians express some passive support for autonomy or secession, 
a hard-core group of separatist militants remains and most ethnic Russians remain 
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oriented toward the Russian Federation.334  Thomas Szayna holds that “if the policies of 
‘ethnic redress’ in Kazakhstan lose their current cautious edge, the likelihood of Russian 
secessionism gaining strength in northern Kazakhstan is strong.  Russian leadership in 
Moscow would be hard pressed not to support their fellow Russians.”335  Geopolitical 
and economic considerations have overridden any irredentist urges in Moscow thus far 
and it is likely that they would have a restraining effect in the future. 
b. Militant Islamists 
Nazarbayev always viewed Islam as a potential source danger to his rule, 
as well the greatest threat to stability in Central Asia.  The regime feared its legitimacy 
would be called into question due to its secular nature if a religious revival occurred.  
Besides this, there were early fears that an increase in Islamic practice would further 
alienate ethnic Russians.  Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state not to give Islam a 
special legal status.  Nazarbayev also actively promoted Russian Orthodoxy’s status in an 
attempt to counterbalance potential problems.  Religious activities are monitored closely, 
especially those of foreigners, such as Pentecostal Protestants and Muslim ‘Wahhabi’ 
missionaries.  A tremendous building boom for mosques and religious schools occurred 
after independence financed with foreign money.  Even with that, foreign entities not in 
Kazakhstan in an official capacity caught proselytizing—the definition of this activity has 
continued to broaden—have been quickly deported; however, indigenous religious 
leaders have largely been left alone and accepted.  The state continues to try to perpetuate 
the Soviet era emphasis on Islam as a tradition versus as a faith and like Uzbekistan there 
is a state controlled muftiate, the Muslim Ecclesiastic Administration.336 
Islam was late arriving in Kazakhstan and has traditionally been moderate 
in nature, lacking a fundamentalism like that present in the Ferghana Valley.337  In 
Clark’s words, “compared to many of its neighbors, many observers would say, 
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Kazakhstan has been blessed with a healthy brand of Islam.”338  By and large, 
Kazakhstan’s Muslims have been secular in viewpoint and tolerant of other religions.  
With communism’s collapse an upsurge in interest resulted, but this did not manifest 
itself in the political arena.  It has been more of a cultural and ethnic identity issue.  The 
ethnic composition of the state also hindered Islamist oppositionists from developing 
power bases.  Some see these as causal mechanisms for the absence of large acts of 
extremist violence on the Kazakh landscape.339 
Although radical movements have posed no threat to Kazakhstan to date, 
the government has begun to sound some alarms.  There are arguments that the patterns 
that led to extremism elsewhere are starting to be seen there.  Missionaries from states 
like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan continue to 
plague the government by preaching for the creation of an Islamic state.  Fundamentalist 
religious education is more common, whether at home or abroad.  Militant cells have 
appeared in Kazakhstani prisons, which could pose a problem as Kazakhstan is said to 
have one of the higher per capita incarceration rates in the world.  The age bracket with 
the largest number identifying themselves as believers is the 18 to 29 grouping, which in 
Olcott’s opinion indicates something of a real religious revival, particularly among the 
poorer, less educated subgrouping.  After the 1999 Tashkent bombings in Uzbekistan and 
the IMU raids in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, reverberations were felt in Kazakhstan.  
The government increased pressure on religious groups and increased spending for its 
security organs.  A special anti-terrorism force and an Anti-Terrorist Center, as part of the 
National Security Committee, were created.  United States trainers began to work with 
Kazakhstani Special Forces units to improve their counterinsurgency capabilities.  
Diplomatic channels were also used to build regional and international cooperation on 
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anti-Islamist efforts.  These include agreements in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, United Nations, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.340 
HT cells have operated in Kazakhstan since the 1990s and have slowly 
gained in popularity.  Some analysts link HT’s growth in this state to the immigration of 
ethnic Uzbeks after the 1999 Tashkent bombings and those in Bukhara and Tashkent in 
2004.  While reported arrests date back to at least 2001 when security forces were 
stunned by the appearance of thousands of leaflets in Almaty on Nazarbayev’s birthday, 
the president specifically warned his populace about this group in a 2004 press 
conference—claiming to have seized 11,000 of their leaflets, an increase over the 1,000 
from the previous year.  This rationale served as the basis for a new anti-extremism law.  
When one delves deeper, however, evidence reveals that HT’s recruiting successes in 
Kazakhstan are primarily within the Uzbek minority living there, primarily in the heavily 
populated, poorer southern border towns.  While some of the messages target the 
perceived illegitimacy of Nazarbayev’s regime, the content of the majority of the seized 
leaflets is written in Uzbek and relays an anti-Karimov message.  Polling data describes 
Uzbeks as the most religious group in the country.  Overall, arrests of HT members 
remain at a low level in Kazakhstan—hundreds versus thousands in Uzbekistan.  Many of 
those arrested are unemployed youths, who get paid for distributing the material.341 
One issue concerning both the Nazarbayev regime and surrounding states 
is that Kazakhstani territory has been used for training camps and as a transit route for 
Islamist elements.  As early as 2001, camps were closed down in the mountainous region 
surrounding Almaty.  Uzbek officials regularly complain that extremists targeting it train 
and operate out of the border regions between the two states.  Kazakh officials, who 
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periodically denied this, surprised many in 2004 when they admitted to arresting a dozen 
purported members of the IJG, which had claimed responsibility for the Bukhara-
Tashkent suicide bombings.  This was followed up with announced apprehensions of 
terrorists with foreign ties in April and November 2006 in Almaty and the Akmola region 
respectively.  This may indicate an increasing threat or merely that the state security 
forces are increasingly active.342 
Rashid claims that Nazarbayev’s complete suppression of moderate 
secular opposition has “left the field to extremists, notably Islamic militants trained in 
Afghanistan, and Russian and Cossack settlers clamoring for greater autonomy.”343  In a 
2005 report for the United Nations, the Public Policy Research Center challenges this 
assertion, stating that “the influence of Islam in Kazakhstan is insignificant, because of 
the weak adherence to Islamic traditions, high rates of modernization have pushed Islam 
to the periphery of public life.”344  While some extremist movements like HT are active, 
anti-Kazakh terrorist groups do not appear to be present currently—no ‘Islamic 
Movement of Kazakhstan’ exists.  There is no state-wide network in place that could 
mobilize opposition.  What support there is for Islamist groups tends to be limited to 
specific geographic regions, specifically among Uzbeks living on the Kazakh-Uzbek 
border.  Starobin’s investigation found that Nazarbayev’s generally lighter hand on 
religion, especially when compared to Karimov, had not generated the same 
revolutionary zeal.  Rather than turning to radical Islam, most oppositionists and the 
public continue to work for reform within the secular framework of the state.  
Additionally, the secessionist threat continues to fade as time passes.  Taken together, 
Kazakhstan faces only low levels of threat from secular and Islamist oppositionists, 
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although the regime perceives it as higher.345  Finally, the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index report for 2006 provides a good summary point for this section.  It states, “There is 
virtually no competition with the state’s monopoly on the use of force.”346 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals that there is a match between the conservative tendencies of 
the regime and elite clan politics and the actual environment that is currently present in 
each state.  Returning to Snyder’s diagram on the trajectories of neopatrimonial regimes 
we will see how this is the case (see Figure 4). 
Neither Kazakhstan nor Uzbekistan has an autonomous military structure.  The 
military is tightly controlled by the regimes with all key personnel appointments based 
more on personal loyalty than qualifications and ability.  Military hardware acquisitions 
are tightly managed by the regime with acquisitions reportedly more politically motivated 
than necessarily need-based.  There are reports that some equipment taken from western 
sources proved useless for local purposes.347  They represent the two best militaries in the 
region, but, again, the bar is low and these two states have the largest population base and 
resource pool from which to pull.  While both regimes have sought to improve the 
capabilities of the military, they put more resources into their national security services, 
which actively penetrate and monitor the armed forces for loyalty. 
In the same vein moderate opposition in both states is weak.  Opposition political 
figures have been jailed, harassed, threatened, and physically assaulted.  Most top level 
leaders are in exile and most analysts concur that these figures have lost touch with and 
are out of sync with the desires of the public.  Karimov has essentially destroyed political 
opposition and civil society in Uzbekistan.  While in Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has 
successfully rooted out any effective opposition without resorting to the same ‘scorched 
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earth’ strategy—one oppositionist and some non-affiliated candidates were periodically 
allowed to be elected and serve in parliament.  Nazarbayev has essentially been more 
strategic in his use of violence.  As such, it appears Nazarbayev remains much more 





Figure 4.   Results of analysis of Uzbekistan & Kazakhstan.348 
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Finally, no effective revolutionary opposition exists in either state.  In 
Kazakhstan, ethnic Russian secessionism appears to be under control.  Nazarabyev’s 
skillful avoidance of issues that would have been generated a strong and public 
nationalism, continued economic opportunities, and emigration back to the Russian 
Federation are likely responsible for this.  An issue described in the 1990s as a 
‘tinderbox’ has largely “subsided through a combination of legal guarantees, state 
coercion, and symbolic politics.”349  Islamist opposition never materialized in 
Kazakhstan.  Those elements that exist are largely ethnic Uzbeks focused on the 
overthrow of Karimov.  Islamic practice has not migrated toward the militant political 
variant and opposition still resides in the secular political system, even though it is still a 
heavily controlled environment.  Conversely, in Uzbekistan, despite attempts by groups 
like the IMU to foment revolution, no one has managed to bring the populace onto the 
streets.  While there is active recruiting by radical Islamists in the Ferghana Valley, no 
group is successfully mobilizing the public or is currently strong enough to stand against 
the Uzbek security organs.  Taken together, when these characteristics are placed into 
Snyder’s theoretical framework (see Figure 4 above), it demonstrates that under the 
current conditions regime stability is the most likely outcome of the succession issue that 
hangs over Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  As such, Snyder’s theoretical lens leads to the 
conclusion that there is not a mismatch between the conservative status quo tendencies 
revealed in the previous chapter and the current environment in these states. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Oliker accurately muses that “if, in the summer of 2001, the International Crisis 
Group could safely write (with regard to Central Asia) that ‘no outside power is 
sufficiently interested in the region to make major investments in its security,’ this is 
clearly no longer the case.”350  This region, which it is likely few, even in military and 
government circles, could have located on a map on September 10, 2001, suddenly leapt 
onto the world stage again.  Both concerns about the Global War on Terrorism and 
desires to play a role in the region’s energy politics drove a rise in American interest.  
Russia grew concerned that its sphere of influence was being eroded by the construction 
of American military bases and that its soft underbelly might become directly exposed to 
radical Islamists if they gained a foothold in Central Asia.  Additionally, Russian 
politicians and business interests feared the loss of access to and revenue from the oil and 
natural gas reserves present there.  China’s presence in the region has grown 
tremendously as that country attempts to meet its skyrocketing energy requirements.  
China also shares Russian concerns over Islamist militants given the presence of groups 
such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in its Xinjiang Region, which shares a 
border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  India has joined the fray with its 
intentions of opening the first military base outside its borders in Tajikistan.  Indian 
officials are also seeking to satiate its growing electricity needs by gaining access to 
electricity generation projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Indian regional involvement 
has the dual benefit of also putting pressure on Pakistan, which has long sought to boost 
its economic and diplomatic ties to the region. 
Given all of the above, stability in Central Asia is desired by all of the major 
players, in addition to the regimes themselves.  What is more, instability in either of these 
two states could have devastating consequences for neighboring states given the 
interconnectedness of the region.  The succession issue could represent to gravest danger 
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to stability in the near future.  Given the ages of the two leaders involved, they could pass 
from the scene without warning via death or illness.  Assassinations and accidents cannot 
be ruled out.  What also cannot be discounted is that either or both of these leaders will 
choose to shun retirement and attempt to perpetuate their power for the remainder of their 
lives.  However, at some point, whether by human decision or natural expiration, there 
will be a transfer of power.  If it does occur in their lifetimes, a groomed replacement, 
reminiscent of Vladimir Putin in Russia, appears to be the most likely choice.  Then the 
question arises of the acceptability to the general populace, oppositionists (such as exist), 
and the elites of allowing this type of managed handoff to occur.351 
Central Asia has witnessed three different types of leadership changes thus far.  In 
Tajikistan, the situation degenerated into a civil war when the government mismanaged 
clan and oppositionist relations.  Turkmenistan essentially saw Snyder’s regime stability 
idea played out with an orderly handover of power decided among the elite stakeholders 
after Niyazov’s death.  Askar Akayev was ushered out of power in Kyrgyzstan during a 
popular uprising engineered and led by moderate opposition figures, who essentially 
represented competing elite networks.  Initially, the Tajik Civil War was used by the 
other regimes to rationalize their need to a strong hand to maintain order.  Later, the Tulip 
Revolution replaced it in the regional rhetoric.  Yet, Akayev’s chaotic end does not 
predetermine a similar fate for either of the regimes in question any more than the Tajik 
Civil War did.  What it does mean in the eyes of many analysts is that the likelihood that 
revolutionary Islamists or opposition groups will take a shot at them, if there is ever a 
suitable opening, has risen.352 
The international community must take the regional context into consideration in 
its pushes for political reform.  It would be extremely difficult to reform the current 
systems in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan due to the need to deal with the patronage 
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networks and the inevitable corruption that such a situation engenders.353  Katz argues 
that “attempting to eliminate what the ruling elites gain from corruption would be 
extremely dangerous because this would motivate them to overcome their rivalries and 
unite.”354  Starr supports this by stating that “it is the power brokers, clan leaders, and 
magnates who launched presidents Akaev, Nazarbayev, and Karimov, rather than vice 
versa.  In Tajikistan their failure in this effort led directly to the civil war.”355  Collins 
sums this by simply stating that “any plans that don’t take the sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic realities of clan politics into account are bound to fail.”356  Deliberations 
over selecting a new leader bring the leadership of elite factions into a potentially 
destabilizing scenario.  Potential replacements are much more likely to be evaluated by 
elite elements based on the criterion of maintaining the status quo than they are for their 
abilities to further state interests.  Otherwise, the elite coalitions that traditionally 
surround the process and bring about an orderly transition could be threatened, as some 
elements come to view rivals as growing too strong and their interests as not being 
considered.  Despite a few issues that have arisen, there are few indicators that there is a 
legitimate split forming within elite circles capable of breaking down the current status 
quo.357 
Oppositionists do no appear poised to affect the process greatly.  As Starr stated, 
“Long before Putin jailed potential rival Mikhail Khodorkovskii, Presidents Nazarbayev 
and Karimov had driven their rivals Akezhan Kazhegeldin (Kazakhstan) and Abdurrahim 
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Pulatov and Mohammad Salikh (Uzbekistan) from the country.”358  Opposition is largely 
banned.  In Uzbekistan, crushed is a more appropriate description, while in Kazakhstan 
some opposition figures are openly still in the country.  However, when they appear to 
get too strong or outspoken, Nazarbayev takes steps to ensure they do not become 
problematic.  The press is heavily restricted and most is owned or operated by regime 
family members or loyalists.  The incumbents dominate both the legislatures and 
judiciaries.  The opposition that exists has largely been driven underground.359 
Many commentators have also argued that the poverty, corruption, and oppression 
present in the region should have caused radical Islamism to gain a much greater foothold 
than it has.  This is not to say that these issues have not made recruitment easier.  Yet, 
while carrying out some dramatic attacks, the IMU never developed a following large 
enough to threaten the Karimov regime and a similar organization never arose in 
Kazakhstan.  HT appears to be growing and currently generates the greatest concern, but 
it has yet to show a propensity for action or to develop a definite platform for change, 
other than general calls for the instatement of the caliphate.360  Mihalka makes the point 
that “poor structural conditions are not enough for radical Islam to succeed; it must also 
organize systematically and have effective courses of action.”361  They must also 
overcome the fact that Islamic movements or parties are outlawed by the state, which 
makes supporting them dangerous to potential adherents.  What is more, these types of 
revolutionary movements, or ‘popular fronts’ in Bichel’s words, are modern creations 
with no historical foundations in the fabric of society.  These popular fronts must find a 
way to integrate themselves into a framework were loyalties are dominated by 
traditionalist mindset of clan politics if they are to be effective.362  “In short, the primary 
obstacle that the popular fronts face is their lack of familiar roots and allegiances.  The 
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usurpation of family ties as the primary basis of societal relations…would be 
revolutionary in and of itself.”363  As Naumkin argues, these ‘solidarity groups’ will 
continue to make popular mobilization difficult.364  The protests that do occur tend to be 
of an economic rather than of a political nature. 
Additionally, as Crane Brinton argued in The Anatomy of a Revolution, “no 
government has ever fallen before attackers until it has lost control over its armed forces 
or lost the ability to use them effectively.”365  O’Donnell and Schmitter support this by 
stating that “no transition can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which 
maintains the cohesion, capacity, and disposition to apply repression.”366  Unlike Akayev 
in Kyrgyzstan, both executives reviewed in this thesis appear ready and willing to use 
force when the need arises.  On the other hand, this willingness does not always translate 
into effective use.  Even small scale defections on the part of military or security forces 
could prove crucial.  At that point, they are no longer confronting unarmed civilians or 
armed insurgents, but armed fellow members of the state security apparatus.  Conversely, 
they may simply refuse to fire when called upon and sit out the situation to see who wins.  
Either could prove catastrophic to the regime in question and signal its end.  Yet, the 
absence of a defection can be fatal for even a large scale revolutionary uprising.  Karimov 
and Nazarbayev both probably have a greater coercive capacity than at any time in their 
regimes—although some question their abilities to handle uprisings that are not confined 
to a limited geographic region, but spread throughout the entire state.  The armed forces 
are thoroughly co-opted into their patronage networks and the state security services, 
themselves reliable, have infiltrated them to monitor their loyalty.  The cost of exercising 
this capacity can at times be measured in increased alienation from the populace and 
increase support for radicals.  Since, once force is used, a choice to not use it in the future 
will be viewed by regime opponents as weakness and result in the creation of even more 
opponents rather than as a positive change due to existing anger over previous instances.  
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Bolstering our current cases, however, is Laura Adams’ argument that moderate 
repression is much more dangerous for a regime than its full employment, as is especially 
evident in Uzbekistan.367 
Leadership transition in these two states could be messy given the lack of 
institutional will to utilize the available constitutional provisions and mechanisms.  
Efforts to have generational transfers to children or in-laws could be particularly tricky.  
The current regimes may be strong enough to fend off any competitors, but there is no 
guarantee that their replacements will be.  It took several years for Karimov and 
Nazarbayev to consolidate their positions after being given the reins.  These states have 
varying combinations of disaffected clans and other elites, along with oppositionists of a 
democratic or Islamist nature that have been waiting for a chance to improve their 
situation politically and/or economically for almost two decades.  They are not likely to 
view being sidelined throughout another administration as acceptable if they are in a 
position to do anything about it.  Another group to add to the mix is those who, while 
loyal insiders currently, become disaffected by the transition process and perceive they 
have been snubbed in some way.  Any attempt by the public at large to protest might be 
seized on by forces attempting to carry out another ‘color revolution’ or by Islamist 
revolutionaries.368  O’Donnell and Schmitter, while not speaking directly about these 
regimes, identify the key summary point for this issue.  They assert “that there is no 
transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important 
divisions within the authoritarian regime itself.”369 
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The legitimacy of the current regimes is very much tied to their ability to 
redistribute state resources throughout the various patronage networks that permeate the 
state.  They do not have a party ideology to fall back on.370  Cummings argues that “the 
political elite’s ability to ensure economic redistribution will be its surest guarantee of 
keeping society together.”371  McGlinchey views patronage politics as “the thin skin 
holding Central Asian states together.”372  The key incendiary problem in both Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan appears to have been a mismanagement of the clan issue and attempts to 
restrict certain groups’ access to power and resources, which pushed them into forming a 
strong opposition.373  However, even with all of these factors there is a strong vein of 
conservatism in the regimes, clan politics, and current situations inside each state as 
displayed by Snyder’s criteria, which could serve to facilitate controlled handoffs more in 
the style of Turkmenistan at Saparmurat Niyazov’s death in December 2006, than the 
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan or the Civil War in Tajikistan. 
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